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INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE COMMODITIES
MARKET: CONVERGENCE OF
REGULATORY ACTIVITY
Frank S. Shyn"
INTRODUCTION

An expansion of markets and an increase in investor participation
characterizes the financial services industry today.' Due to the growth,
older markets in the United States and the United Kingdom face
challenges from newly emerging markets.2 The internationalization of

J.D. Candidate, 1995, The American University, Washington College of Law. The
author would like to thank the Division of Trading and Markets and the Division of
Economic Analysis of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission for their assistance
and his parents for their continued support.
1. See Joseph A. Grundfest, Internationalizationand Regulation of the World's
Securities Markets, in REGULATING INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETS: ISSUES AND
POLICIES 123 (Franklin R. Edwards & Hugh T. Patrick eds., 1992) (noting that foreign involvement in the U.S. markets rose 21% annually from $75.1 billion in 1980
to $416.3 billion in 1989; U.S. involvement in the foreign markets rose 32.8%
annually, from $17.9 billion in 1980 to $230.3 billion in 1989; direct investment from
foreign participants in the U.S. markets rose 22.3% annually from $65.5 billion in
1980 to $400.8 billion in 1989; and that direct United States investment in foreign
markets rose 6.3% annually from $215.4 billion in 1980 to $373.4 billion in 1989);
Michael S. Sackheim, International Futures Transactions: The United States as Global
Regulator, 24 J. WORLD TRADE 105, 107 (1990) (suggesting that the globalization of
the market is illustrated by additional trading linkages among international commodity
exchanges- increases in the number of exemption status applications; opening up of
options on foreign futures contracts that were banned previously from circulation in
U.S. markets; and innovative electronic trading advances that allow for 24-hour
trading).
2. See Toyoo Gyohten, Global Financial Markets: The Past, the Future, and
Public Policy Questions, in REGULATING INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETS: ISSUES
AND POLICIES 13, 18-20 (Franklin R. Edwards & Hugh T. Patrick eds., 1992) (forecasting that markets in Asia, Central and Eastern Europe, Latin and South America,
and West Africa will play larger roles in the financial markets in the 1990s and
beyond); Franklin R. Edwards, Financial Institutions and Regulation in the 21st Cen*

tury:

After the Crash?, in COMPETITION AND REGULATION IN FINANCIAL MARKETS I

(Albert Verheirstraeten ed., 1981) (concluding that the emergence of new markets,
combined with traditionally established methods of conducting business in the older
markets, have created new problems and concerns).
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financial transactions, especially within the last decade, has not only
intensified the level of competition, but also created a number of previously unencountered barriers such as regulation created by duplicative
procedures and cross-border transactions.3 As a result, the Governments
of the United States and the United Kingdom have reexamined the regulatory positions of the institutions of their financial service industries.4
Several recent events have raised concerns particularly about the future of the commodities market.5 These events encouraged the Commod-

3. See Joseph A. Grundfest, Internationalizationof the World's Securities Markets: Economic Causes and Regulatory Consequences, J. FIN. SERVICE RES. 349, 350
(1990) (noting that typical new barriers include the comparative advantages of local
firms in accounting standards, reporting requirements, and information sharing mechanisms); Robert K. Wilmouth, The Internationalizationof Futures Markets: Issues for
U.S. Markets, in REGULATING INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETS: ISSUES AND
POLICIES 189, 195 (Franklin R. Edwards & Hugh T. Patrick eds., 1992) (indicating
that the issues faced by the financial services industry no longer affect only the domestic arena but also the international arena).
4. See Andrew Large, Financial Services Regulation: Making the Two Tier System Work, SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS BOARD (1993) (discussing a review of Securities and Investment Board (SIB) regulatory responsibilities under the Financial Services Act (FSA)); Protection of Commodity Customers; Risk Disclosure by Futures
Commission Merchants and Introducing Brokers to Customers; Bankruptcy Disclosure,
58 Fed. Reg. 17,495 (1993) (providing amendments designed to both enhance and
simplify the effectiveness of risk disclosure); Revision of Federal Speculative Position
Limits, 58 Fed. Reg. 17,973 (1993) (promulgating interim final rules amending federal
speculative position limits governed by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(CFTC or Commission)); Limited Marketing Activities from a United States Location
by Certain Firms and Their Employees or Other Representatives Exempted Under
Commodity Futures Trading Commission Rule 30.10, 57 Fed. Reg. 49,644 (1992)
(allowing firms which have received rule 30.10 relief to participate in limited
marketing conduct in foreign futures or option contracts within the United States
through employees or other representatives).
5. See Jerry W. Markham & Rita McCloy Stephanz, The Stock Market Crash of
1987-The United States Looks At New Recommendations, 76 GEO. L.J. 1993 (1993)
(indicating that the Stock Market Crash of 1987 cost the New York Stock Exchange
$1 trillion and caused the Chicago Board Options Exchange to abandon its $600
million project to build a location to house New York's commodity futures exchanges). The Stock Market Crash raised concerns about the future and validity of the
CFTC. Id. at 2006. Jerry W. Markham, The Commodity Exchange Monopoly-Reform
Is Needed, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 977, 987-89 (1991) [hereinafter Exchange Monopoly] (stating that the United States Attorney in Chicago executed the Chicago
Sting Operation by charging 46 traders with the violation of federal laws when
undercover agents went into the Chicago Board of Trade (CBT) and the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange (CME) to assess the performance of traders); Large, supra note
4, at 114-15 (suggesting that the inefficiencies of the Investment Management Regula-
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ity Futures Trading Commission to revise many of its rules to address
emerging problems. Similarly, the Securities and Investments Board
produced a report, discussed below, with recommendations for a more
effective regulatory structure.
In light of these changes and concerns, several articles have been
written about the need to standardize international regulatory activity.
Few commentators, however, have explored the convergence of regulatory activity as a viable alternative to standardization. This Comment addresses this issue, by examining the outcome of attempts by the United
States and United Kingdom to restructure their specific regulatory
agencies and to amend the rules governing the supervision of commodity futures and options markets.
Parts I and II of this Comment trace the evolution of the regulation
of commodity futures and options contracts in the United States and the
United Kingdom, with particular emphasis placed on activity and legislation leading up to the creation of the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission, the Securities Investment Board, and respective
self-regulatory organizations. Parts III and IV address amended or
proposed rule changes and various recommendations concerning market

behavior. Specifically, this Comment shall introduce Commodity Futures
Trading Commission rules governing risk disclosure requirements,
speculative position limits, and exemption status for foreign futures and
options transactions.6 This Comment will also discuss recommendations
proposed by Andrew Large, Chairman of the Securities Investment

tory Organization (IMRO), a self-regulatory organization supervised by the SIB, enabled Robert Maxwell to engage in corrupt conduct (i.e., theft from pension funds)).
IMRO failed to detect Maxwell's mischief and the SIB failed to check IMRO's
weaknesses. Id. at 10. Moreover, London FOX engaged in malpractice and
successfully escaped the guard of the SIB. Id.; Norma Cohen, SIB To Take Tougher
Line on Financial Regulation: Large Says Two-Tier System Must Be Made To Work
Better, FIN. TIMES, May 26, 1993, at 1 (pointing out that Norman Lamont, former
Chancellor of the Exchequer, blames the Maxwell affair on the lax supervisory
structure of the Self-Regulatory Organizations (SROs), which enabled the fraudulent
contracting of life insurance and pension funds); Rod McNeil, SIB Concedes Its Lack
of Enforcement, Announces Retreat From Direct Regulation, 5 THOMSON'S INT'L
BANKINo REG. 6 (1993) (stating that the Maxwell Affair became one of the most
embarrassing and costly disasters in the history of the financial services industry in
the United Kingdom); SIB Chairman Outlines Agenda For Financial Services Act
Reform, INT'L SEC. REG. REP., June 29, 1993 [hereinafter SIB Chairman Outlines Reform] (calculating that the Maxwell Affair cost the industry over $650 million).
6. See infra notes 156-227 and accompanying text (describing how these statutory changes improve the competitiveness of the U.S. commodities market).
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Board, regarding future regulatory changes.7 Part V discusses current
channels available for market participants to contribute to and benefit
from international organizations and agreements between regulatory
agencies. In particular, this Comment focuses on the International
Organization of Securities Committee and Memoranda of
Understanding.8 Part VI evaluates proposals for standardization and the
creation of a super-regulatory body governing international commodities
transactions. Part VI also challenges, however, standardization with
self-regulation 9 and individual market manipulation to bring about a
level of convergence. This Comment concludes by proposing that the
best solution to remedy problems raised by the internationalization of
the financial services industry is to foster the gradual convergence of
regulatory policy that will be reached as each agency reacts individually
to market trends and demands.
I. REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
COMMODITIES MARKET
A. THE EARLY YEARS
During the Elizabethan period's discovery, expansion and trade in the
United Kingdom, Sir Thomas Gresham created the first centralized commodities market in 1565 to maximize commercial activity in a trading
intensive environment."0 By the eighteenth century, these rudimentary

7. See infra notes 98-148 and accompanying text (outlining that the two-tier
regulatory structure needs modification tp ensure the productivity of its market).
8. See infra notes 230-76 and accompanying text (indicating that the
International Organization of Securities Committee (IOSCO) and Memoranda of
Understanding (MOUs) provide the only means for international communication and
harmonization of regulatory activity).
9. See Exchange Monopoly, supra note 5, at 1007 (stating that although selfgovernment exists where exchanges predominantly govern their activity, a central
regulatory body, such as a government organization, has the right to intervene and
regulate at its discretion). Moreover, under self-regulation, the central body generally
will refrain from interrupting the daily flow of investment activity. Id.
10. Anthony Belchambers, A History and Overview of the UK Markets, in THE
BRITISH DERIVATIVES MARKETS HANDBOOK 1991/92 3, 5 (Jenny Fry & Jonathan
Grosvenor eds., 1991). Only the Amsterdam Trade Center and the Japanese rice market predated the British commodities market. Id. See BARBARA B. DIAMOND & MARK
D. KOLLAR. 24-HOUR TRADING: THE GLOBAL NETWORK OF FUTURES AND OPTIONS
MARKETS 5 (1989) (asserting that Japan was the first nation to transact in futures
contracts in 1679). In 1730, the city of Osaka set up the first futures market called
the Dojima Rice Trading Board. Id. See also RAYMOND M. LEUTHOLD ET AL., THE
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procedures evolved into a systematic practice whereby traders and inves-

tors assembled at select coffee houses to perform financial transactions." As the markets expanded on both domestic and international
fronts, merchants sought new methods to stabilize prices from sudden
and unexpected fluctuations.' The creation of the "forward contract"' 3
resolved this concern by stabilizing prices through the performance of
commodities contracts of actual commodities before physical delivery.' 4
By the nineteenth century, however, cheap labor and improved transportation and communication 5 produced rapid industrialization and expansion of the empire, which led to the demise of the forward con-

tract. 6 In its place, technological advances inspired the creation of futures contracts.

7

In 1878, the London Corn Trade Association"s per-

THEORY AND PRACICE OF FUTURES MARKETS 367 (1989) (suggesting that Holland
futures markets transacted in tulip bulbs).
11. Belchambers, supra note 10, at 5. Founded in 1652, St. Michael's Alley was
the first coffee house created specifically for commodities transactions. Id. Each coffee
house traded a particular commodity such as the grain market of the Virginian and
Baltic Coffee houses and metals of the Jerusalem Coffee house, Id. Furthermore, these
coffee houses eventually became London's futures and options exchanges. Id.
12. See Belchambers, supra note 10, at 6-7 (attributing market fluctuations to
weather patterns, irregular production or changes in producer or consumer nation stability).
13. See COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT 141
(1992) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT] (explaining that a forward contract is one where
a commercial "buyer and seller agree upon delivery of a specified quality and quantity of goods at a specified future date"). A price may be fixed in advance, or resolved at the time of delivery. Id. See also Belchambers, supra note 10, at 6 (asserting that contracts devised by the Liverpool cotton traders in the late eighteenth
century provide the earliest example of forward contracts in the United Kingdom).
14. See Belchambers. supra note 10. at 6 (noting that forward contracts secured
both price and supply while bypassing strorage costs and allowed speculators .to speculate on price without having to take immediate delivery).
15. See Belchambers, supra note 10, at 6 (conceding that the development of
railways, steamships, a postal system, and the telephone greatly facilitated trade during
this period).
16. See Belchambers, supra note 10, at 7 (stating that the-restrictive requirements
of a forward contract lacked the flexibility preferred in a market based on free trade).
17. See Belchambers, supra note 10, at 7 (noting that the inadequacies of the
forward contract led to the development of the futures contract); see also ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 13, at 141-42 (defining a futures contract as "an agreement to
purchase or sell a commodity for delivery in the future: (1) at a price that is determined at initiation of the contract; (2) which obligates each party to the contract to
fulfill the contract at the specified price; (3) which is used to assume or shift price
risks; and (4) which may by satisfied by delivery or offset").
18. See generally Belchambers, supra note 10, at 7 (stating that the CBT devel-
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formed the first official futures contract in the United Kingdom, modeled after the Chicago Board of Trade contract. 9 In 1888, to compleby guaranteeing payments" and to facilitate the
ment those contracts
' of opposite
"clearing out"21
contracts arising from futures contracts,market participants created the London Produce Clearing House.22
These events set the stage for the modem commodities market.
B.

BANK OF ENGLAND AND OTHER REGULATORY BODIES

Prior to the Financial Services Act of 1986 (FSA),23 there was minimal statutory regulation in the U.K. market.24 Although laws such as

oped the first official futures contract which standardized quality, quantity, and delivery month). The contract received immediate acceptance from speculators and hedgers who found standardized contract variables more effective for taking either opposite
position in an off-setting futures contract. Id.
19. Belchambers, supra note 10, at 7 (suggesting that Liverpool cotton trade
merchants actually utilized crude futures contracts to import cotton from the United
States prior to the establishment of the London Corn Trade Association).
20. See Belchambers, supra note 10, at 8 (noting that the increase in anonymous
trading and transactions performed through intermediaries, demanded the formation of
an independent clearing facility to guarantee against system default).
21. See ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 13, at 130 (defining "clearing" as "the procedure through which the clearing house or association becomes buyer to each seller
of a futures contract, and seller to each buyer, and assumes responsibility for protecting buyers and sellers from financial loss by assuring performance on each contract").
22. See Belchambers, supra note 10, at 8 (stating that the London Produce
Clearing House both guaranteed contracts, and registered and cleared out equal and
opposite contracts). Futures contracts must work in conjunction with clearing houses.
Id. See also DAVID COURTNEY, FROM FORUM TO FUTURES 137 (1991) (stating that
clearing houses register contracts, supervise positions by posting margins, charge a fee
to ensure payment, and buy or sell any defaulted contracts on the open market).
23. See Jonathan Brayne, The U.K. Financial Services Act 1986, 20 REV. SEC. &
COMM. REG. 51 (1987) (stating that the Financial Services Act of 1986 (FSA) was
the British Parliament's first attempt at regulating the financial services industry);
Ronald H. Filler & Jeffrey A. Mayer, Summary of the New U.K. Financial Services
Act and Related Regulatory Developments, 6 COMM. L. LETrER 1 (1987) (confirming
that the FSA provides the investment community with an extensive series of statutory
regulation).
24. See Phillip A. Thorpe, Regulation of Futures Markets in the United Kingdom,
in REGULATING INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETS: IssuEs AND POLICIES 161
(Franklin R. Edwards & Hugh T. Patrick eds., 1992) (indicating that markets primarily relied on self-regulation since no organized body supervised the market system);
William Albrecht, Address at FIA/FOW International Conference (June 10, 1993)
(stating that "the primary regulatory power was described to me as 'the raised eye-
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the Gaming Act of 1845,' Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act of
1939,26 Exchange Control Act of 1947,7 and the Banking Act of

1979' existed, their effect was inconsequential.29 Traditionally, the
Bank of England regulated the United Kingdom's Commodity Futures
Market.3 ' Nevertheless, the market itself remained primarily responsible
for the effective monitoring of its members.3' Ultimately, "club" principles32 rather than statutory rules33 dominated regulatory behavior.
The Association of Futures Brokers and Dealers, Ltd. (AFBD), founded in London in October 1984, emerged as the first self-regulatory organization to combat increasing abuse in the futures market.' On April
brow of the Governor of the Bank of England"') (on file with The American University Journal of International Law and Policy). See also COURTNEY, supra note 22, at
137 (stating that the regulation of British futures markets is governed by an internal
organization rather than any statutory based regulation).
25. See Thorpe, supra note 24, at 162 (suggesting that the Gaming Act checked
the authenticity and validity of contracts that resulted in cash settlements).
26. See Thorpe, supra note 24, at 162 (noting that the Prevention of Fraud (Investment) Act of 1939 focused more specifically on securities rather than on futures
trading and concerned investigatory activities).
27. See Thorpe, supra note 24, at 162 (stating that the Exchange Control Act of
1947 required the reporting of foreign exchange remittances to the Bank of England
and established a systematic reporting method to assess customer exposure and concentration risk). The reporting requirements nurtured a closer relationship between
commodities and the futures market. Id.
28. See Thorpe, supra note 24, at 162 (explaining that the Banking Act enforced
the registration of brokers who received deposits, an activity deemed fundamental to
futures trading).
29. See Thorpe, supra note 24, at 162 (concluding that the four legislative acts
had a minimal or indirect connection with the commodities futures market).
30. See Thorpe, supra note 24, at 162-63 (explaining that the Bank of England
consisted of a twenty person body that supervised market activity by reviewing trading information and notifying the market participants during periods of volatility).
31. See Thorpe, supra note 24, at 161 (noting that the markets have relied largely upon self-regulation). The Bank of England's fundamental role was to regulate
membership in the exchanges by imposing admissions requirements. Id. at 163.
32. See Thorpe, supra note 24, at 161 (suggesting that "club" principles strictly
limited membership and internally distributed discipline for those members who
violated club rules).
33. See Thorpe, supra note 24, at 163 (noting that clearing houses contributed to
the regulatory system by supervising the levels of solvency and exposure of their
members).
34. TRADING N FUTURES 64 (T.H. Stewart ed., 1989) [hereinafter TRADING IN
FUTURES]. The Association of Futures Brokers and Dealers. Ltd. (AFBD) performed
non-statutory regulatory functions but instituted a type of regulatory framework by
protecting investors while ensuring an efficient market with minimal regulation. Id.
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1, 1991, two major self-regulatory organizations (SROs), The Securities
Association35 and the Association of Futures Brokers and Dealers,
merged to form the Securities and Futures Authority to minimize costs
while ensuring effective regulation of derivative market participants.36
As SROs evolved, the Bank of England officially assumed a secondary
position as an intermediary between market institutions.'
II. UNITED STATES REGULATORY HISTORY OF THE

COMMODITIES MARKET
A. THE CHICAGO BOARD OF TRADE
In the United States, commodity futures regulation originated with the
Chicago Board of Trade (CBT)3 Businessmen who sought to develop
a commercial exchange for grain merchants created the CBT.39 During
the 1800s, market participants expressed the need to implement forward
and futures contracts to protect farmers from erratic price fluctuations.40
As the use of futures contracts flourished, the United States Congress

See Anthony Belchambers, The Joint Exchanges Committee-Its Role and Activities,
in BRITISH DERIVATIVES MARKET HANDBOOK 1991/1992 40 (Jenny Fry & Jonathan
Grosvenor eds., 1991) (stating that the Joint Exchanges Committee, comprised of
members of each of London's futures and options exchanges, formed the AFBD).
35. See Filler & Mayer, supra note 23, at 10 (stating that The Stock Exchange
and The International Securities Regulatory Organization merged to form the Securities
Association to supervise the domestic and international securities investments and
financial futures and options transactions).
36. Michael Blair, The Governing Legislation, in BRITISH DERIVATIVFS MARKETS
HANDBOOK 1991/92 11 (Jenny Fry & Jonathan Grosvenor eds., 1991).
37. Thorpe, supra note 24, at 164. The Bank of England has renounced much of
its powers to the SIB and the self-regulatory organizations (SROs) who now monitor
membership status of the firms and govern the activities of those firms. Id.
38. See Legislative Act (State of Illinois) to Incorporate the Board- of Trade,
Chicago, Feb. 18, 1859, reproduced in THE RULEBOOK OF THE CHICAGO BOARD OF
TRADE (1859) (illustrating that the members of the CBT established rules and regulations governing trade in gold and grain).
39. John H. Stassen, The Commodity Exchange Act in Perspective: A Short and
'Not-So-Reverent History of Futures Trading Legislation in the United States, 39
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 825, 826 (1982) (stating that businessmen sought ways to
settle disputes arising from commercial arbitrage and other areas ignored by the judicial system).
40. See Markham, supra note 5, at 1997 (noting that the forward and futures
contract standardized the system of trading and delivery). Grain was abundant in
certain periods thereby decreasing the price; at other times, there were shortages that
increased the price of grain above production and transportation costs. Id.
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sought ways to regulate futures activity.4'
When farm prices improved, efforts to attack the futures markets
subsided.42 However, with prices beginning to decline in 1921 and with
the nation facing an agricultural depression, farmers urged congressional
action.43 Senators Tincher and Clapper unsuccessfully attempted to pass
the Futures Trading Act of 1921." Nevertheless, with the advice45 of
William Taft, the Chief Justice and former President, Congress redrafted
the act. This redraft became the Grain Futures Act of 1922,46 a law
which served as a model for further federal financial regulation.
41. Stassen, supra note 39, at 827. As early as 1864, Congress, comparing futures trading to gambling, issued an act that banned gold futures trading and stated
that "the ability to sell what isn't hissun was and is the hallmark of futures trading."
Id. Representative Hatch proposed the Anti-Options Bill but lost by a 25 vote margin
in the House. Id. See LEUTHOLD ET AL., supra note 10, at 369 (explaining that the
Hatch Act of 1893 was not ratified due to effective lobbying by commodity traders
promoting the right to speculate).
42. Stassen, supra note 39, at 829. Efforts to regulate futures activity primarily
revolve around periods of price volatility. Id. See Holbrook Working, Futures Trading
and Hedging, cited in B. Goss & B. Yamey, THE ECONOMICS OF FUTURES TRADING
47 (1976) (maintaining that since market participants blame futures trading for disruptions in price levels and movements, they attempt to regulate futures trading).'
43. Stassen, supra note 39, at 829. The populace voted for a Republican administration that promised to take action against the CBT, an entity that farmers believed
caused their problems. Id.
44. Act of August 24, 1921, ch. 86, 42 Stat. 187 (1921) (repealed 1922). The
Futures Trading Act of 1921 compelled traders to pay a prohibitive tax if they engaged in futures transactions outside government licensed exchanges. Id. See Hill v.
Wallace, 259 U.S. 44 (1922) (stating that the Supreme Court concluded that this act
was unconstitutional because it unlawfully extended Congressional taxing power); see
also LEUTHOLD ET AL., supra note 10, at 369 (explaining that a 20-cent tax imposed
on each bushel contracted off-exchange was unconstitutional).
45. Stassen, supra note 39, at 830 (noting a suggestion by President Taft that
Congress should emphasize that unregulated futures trading could burden interstate
commerce and therefore violate the Commerce Clause).
46. Grain Futures Act, ch. 369, 42 Stat. 998 (1922). See Stassen, supra note 39,
at 831 (asserting that the act mandated that exchanges license the trading in futures
as "contract markets"). Once designated as "contract markets." the licensed exchanges
would ensure a trading environment free from manipulation. Id. If they failed to
comply with statutory provisions, the Secretary of Agriculture would revoke their
license. Id. See also Donald L. Tendick & John G. Gaine, Introducing the Regulator:
The CFTC, 35 Bus. LAW. 751, 755 (1980) (stating that the Grain Futures Act of
1922 was the Government's first attempt at regulating securities (commodities) transactions); Jeffrey W. Bartlett, An Introduction to Commodity Futures: A Regulatory Overview, in 9 INT'L Bus. LAW. 199 (1981) (stating that the act entrusted the Department
of Agriculture with statutory control over the commodity futures market).
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THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT

By 1936, Congress passed the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA), 7
which expanded the Department of Agriculture's authority over the market. 8 Because the CEA allowed Congress to redefine and update the
' to regulate new futures products, the adoption of
term "commodity"49
the CEA signaled the expansion of futures trading into goods other than
grain." In 1968, Congress enacted additional amendments that imposed
stricter duties and filing requirements. 5
C.

THE COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION

ACT

The period between 1968 and 1974 witnessed decreases in U.S. agricultural surplus holdings. 2 To stabilize the volatile market, Congress
47. Commodity Exchange Act, ch. 545, 49 Stat. 1491 (1936). See, e.g., 7 U.S.C.
§§ 1-26 (1988). See Tendick & Gaine, supra note 46, at 756 (affirming that the
Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) governed federal regulation over speculative position
limits, anti-fraud provisions, fictitious trades, and registration of traders). Moreover, the
CEA continues to govern trading in commodities today. Id. See also LEUTHOLD Er
AL., supra note 10, at 370 (illustrating that the act enabled the Government to monitor trading by imposing reporting requirements that exposed the aggregate short and
long positions of hedgers, speculators, spreaders, and any non-reporting traders);
Andrea M. Corcoran & Jane C. Kang, The CFTC's Rules Governing Foreign Futures
and Options Transactions, 7 CoMM. L. LETTER 8 (1987) (explaining that the CEA
was a reaction to Benjamin P. Hutchinson's cornering of the wheat pit, Arthur
Cuttner's manipulation of grain, and options scandals).
48. Stassen, supra note 39, at 832 (noting that the Department of Agriculture
believed that Congress provided it with an ineffective method of exercising power).
49. Stassen, supra note 39, at 832 (explaining that the onion was a commodity
that the Government believed deserved federal protection, and thus, in 1955, Congress
declared onion trading a federal offense). When onion prices later rapidly decreased,
however, onion producers demanded Government action, arguing that the futures trading market triggered low prices. Id.
50. See MARKHAM, supra note 5, at 984 (implying that as trade expanded, new
regulations were required to address innovative commodities now entering the market).
51. Pub. L. No. 90-258, 82 Stat. 26 (1968); see LEUTHOLD Er AL.. supra note
10, at 370 (stating that the 1968 amendments compelled the exchanges to create more
rules, set minimum capital requirements for FCMs, and include new contracts such as
livestock and frozen concentrated orange juice for regulation); Tightened Regulation
for Commodity Exchanges, 55 A.B.A. J. 858 (Sept. 1969) (discussing stricter regulation of commodities).
52. Stassen, supra note 39, at 833 (maintaining that increasing foreign demand
for U.S. grain and protein products and the disappearance of anchovy schools created
a turbulent environment in the futures market).
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enacted the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974
(CFTC Act) 3 and created a federal regulatory agency, the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC or the Commission),' to supervise
all futures activity. 5 Because congressmen remained divided over the
creation of another regulatory agency, 6 the CFTC faced a four-year
"sunset" provision period. 7

The increase in futures transactions in foreign markets raised concerns
from participants about the integrity of the market.5 As a result, Congress adopted the CFTC Act to combat fraud and manipulation fostered
by an underregulated industry. Upon adoption of the act, all commodities transactions, including foreign market contracts, came under the
supervision of the federal government. 9 Moreover, because the CFTC

53. Pub. Law. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389 (1974).
54. See Stassen, supra note 39, at 833 (explaining that the Commission consisted
of five federal commissioners who exercised powers previously held by the Department of Agriculture).
55. See MARKHAM, supra note 5, at 984 (indicating that CFTC obtained powers
to impose fines, seek relief, and supervise futures activity, and that the act broadened
the definition of the term "commodity"); Stassen, supra note 39, at 834 (stating that
the act covered all agricultural futures that previously had escaped regulation such as
coffee, cocoa and sugar; silver and gold; petroleum products; U.S. Treasury bonds.
bills, and notes; and Government National Mortgage Association certificates);
LEUTHOLD ET AL., supra note 10, at 371 (confirming that exchanges require CFTC
approval before new contracts are implemented and rules are amended).
56. See 120 CONG. REc. 10766 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Broyhill) (expressing
concerns that the CFTC could evolve into an inflated bureaucracy).
57. See Stassen, supra note 39, at 834 (noting that when the four-year interim
period terminated in 1978, Congress affirmed the CFTC's authority to regulate all
transactions in commodities and extended its jurisdiction to cover stock-index futuresMahlon M. Frandhauser & Ellen S. Levinson, Commodity Exchange Act Amendments,
25 REV. SEC. & COMM. REG. 245 (1992) (stating that every four years the CFTC
must obtain reauthorization to continue its activity). The CFTC received its last
reauthorization in 1992. Id.
58. See John V. Rainbolt, United States Policy Toward Foreign Commodity Markets: A Critique, 5 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUs. 464, 465 (1983) (stating that until 1975.
trading in metals and tropical commodities remained unregulated in the United States).
Much of the foreign futures transactions occurred in the London soft tropical commodities or non-ferrous metals markets. Id.
59. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463,
88 Stat. 1389 (codified in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.); see 17 C.F.R. § 30.9
(1983) (stating that foreign futures sales became subject to an anti-fraud rule); Foreign Involvement in U.S. Futures Markets, in CFTC REPORT I (Office of Economics
and Education, United States Commodity Futures Trading Commission) (Apr. 20,
1976) (indicating that while legislation targeting foreign participants in U.S. markets
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believed options were highly risky and recognized the scandalous tradition of options, it banned most options transactions in 1978.' The
1982 amendments to the CEA, however, reinstated certain options trans-

actions in agricultural commodities.6'
In 1981, a CFTC Interpretive Letter further incorporated foreign futures activity under the supervision of the CFTC by compelling persons
who sell foreign futures to register with the CFTC as a "Commodity
Trading Advisor."'62 In 1983, Congress expanded the Commission's regulatory authority to cover the sale of futures contracts made on a foreign exchange and sold or transacted in the United States,63 and reversed the 1936 ban on options trading by authorizing the trading of
options on farm commodities.'
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF STATUTORY REGULATIONT IN THE
UNITED KINGDOM
A.

GOWER REPORT

As the futures market developed,6' government officials in the United

would arise later, discussion surfaced with the implementation of the CFTC Act).
60. See Jerry W. Markham & Kyra K. Bergin. The Role of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission in International Commodity Transactions, 18 GEO. WASH.
J. INT'L L. & ECON. 587-88 (1985) (observing that certain dealer options trading
based on an inventory system and commercial options sold to firms that use the
commodities for a commercial purpose were exempt from the ban); see 17 C.F.R. §
32.11(a) (1983) (confirming that the trading of options were banned in the United
States); Rainbolt, supra note 58, at 466 (explaining that CFTC supervision led to the
banning of options because they attracted fraudulent and abusive activity).
61. 7 U.S.C. § 6c(c) (1982); see Markham & Bergin, supra note 60, at 588 (noting that the 1982 amendments were an interim ruling that placed options on a three
year probationary period).
62. CFTC Interpretive Letter 81-1, [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L.
Rep. (CCH) 21,244.
63. Rainbolt. supra note 58, at 470. CFTC has the regulatory authority to require: minimum financial standards; disclosure of risk to customers; the filing of
certain reports, adequate recordkeeping; safeguarding of customers funds; and registration with the Commission. The CFTC also may promulgate rules and regulations that
proscribe fraud. Id.
64. Futures Trading Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-444, § 206, 96 Stat. 2296
(1983). See e.g., 17 C.F.R. §§ 1.19, 1.32, 1.33 (1983). But cf Rainbolt, supra note
58, at 472 (noting that although certain U.S. exchange-based and dealer options are
permissible under the CFTC, foreign options are generally banned).
65. See Introduction to FIN. SERVICES L. & PRAC. Al (Andrew Whittaker ed.,
1989) [hereinafter Introduction] (stating that the investment community in London has
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Kingdom recognized the need for statutory solutions to strengthen investor protection and to reaffirm the reputation of the London markets.'
Thus, the U.K. Government commissioned James Gower67 to study
methods of regulating the futures market." Gower published his first
report in January 1984, recommending a two-tiered organization comprised of, on one level, a government agency to regulate the overall
supervision of the market and, on the other level, SROs to govern daily

supervision."9
Before Gower could publish the second half of his report and in
response to his recommendations, the Bank of England created the
Governor's Advisory Group to begin discussing the regulatory framework for securities, commodities, and financial futures.7" Also in response to the report, in January 1985, the United Kingdom Government
issued the White Paper "Financial Services in the United Kingdom: A
New Framework for Investor Protection" (White Paper).71 Both actions

sought to introduce regulation to provide adequate protection to investors.72

experienced a surge in activity since 1983 due to the liberalization of the Stock
Exchange's rulebook and the internationalization of the financial markets).
66. See id. (stating that the failure of two prominent investment businesses decreased investor confidence).
67. See Thorpe, supra note 24, at 155 (noting that James Gower was the former
Vice Chancellor of Southampton University); Filler & Mayer, supra note 23, at I
(confirming that the U.K. Department of Trade and Industry commissioned James
Gower to produce a report on investor protection).
68. The Regulatory System, in FIN. SERVICES L. & PRAc. 3 (Andrew Whittaker
ed.. 1989) [hereinafter Regulatory System]. The study was to encompass: 1) considerations of existing statutory protection required by private business investors in securities and other property; 2) evaluations of the need for statutory control of securities
dealers, investment consultants and investment managers; and 3) advice concerning
new legislation. ld.; see COURTNEY, supra note 22, at 139 (recognizing that the United Kingdom Government sought to restore the integrity of the markets).
69. Regulatory System, supra note 68, at 3. See Thorpe, supra note 24, at 156
(emphasizing that Gower believed his proposal best incorporated the following four
fundamental ways of protecting investors: regulating the terms of investments; providing for full disclosure; regulating intermediaries; and regulating the modus operandi of
the body in which the investor invests). Gower opined that self-regulation under the
surveillance of the Government was the optimal solution. Id. at 158.
70. Regulatory System, supra note 68, at 3.
71. Introduction, supra note 65, at 2.
72. See Thorpe, supra note 24, at 159 (stating that the United Kingdom Government concluded that regulation should focus on improving the level of efficiency in
the industry,, boosting the level of investor confidence, creating an image of a safe
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FINANCIAL SERVICES ACT OF 1986

Amid this backdrop of legislative reform, the United Kingdom Government enacted the Financial Services Act of 1986 (FSA).' Although
the British Secretary of State sat at the center of the regulatory system
created by the FSA, most of the powers were transferred to the Securities and Investments Board (SIB),74 a regulatory body designed to
supervise the SROs, recognized investment exchanges, clearinghouses,
and recognized professional bodies (RPBs).75 Specifically, the United

and honest environment in which to transact, and encouraging competitive behavior in
both the domestic and international arena); Regulatory System, supra note 68, at 3
(confirming that the White Paper incorporated most of Gower's recommendations).
While these actions indicated that the United Kingdom Government generally agreed
with Gower that investor protection laws were outdated and required strengthening,
they equally recognized the importance of not imposing excessive regulation.
73. Department of Trade and Industry, FINANCIAL SERvICES IN THE UNITED
KINGDOM: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR INVESTOR PROTECTION (1985 Command Paper
9432) London, HMSO. The Financial Services Act (FSA) was introduced in December
1985 as "self-regulation within a statutory framework." Introduction, supra note 65, at
2. See Thorpe, supra note 24. at 165 (stating that the regulation of investment activity finally has received the attention of London administrators); Regulatory System,
supra note 68, at 4 (indicating that, in order to account for the internationalization of.
the markets, the FSA would affect financial services activities within the United Kingdom and any foreign activity coming into the United Kingdom); Filler & Mayer,
supra note 23, at 15 (stating that the FSA protects investors with a series of regulations similar to securities and commodities regulations found in the United States.
such as full disclosure and segregation of funds). See also Norman S. Poser, Big
Bang and the Financial Services Act Seen Through American Eyes, 14 BROOKLYN J.
INT'L L. 317, 318 (1988) (explaining that a series of changes, referred to as the "Big
Bang," deregulated the London Stock Exchange and encouraged the Government to
enact the FSA to support the restructured securities market in the United Kingdom).
This temporary period of deregulation created the opportunity for fraudulent activity
that occurred in the early 1990s. Id. at 330; Patrick M. Creaven, Inside Outside
Leave Me Alone: Domestic and EC-Motivated Reform in the U.K. Securities Industry,
60 FORDHAM L. REV. S285, S289 (1992) (stating that the Government attempted to
replace the standard of self-regulation of the Big Bang period with the FSA, one act
encapsulating all of Britain's securities laws and allowing for greater government
interaction).
74. See Creaven, supra note 73. at 5291 (explaining that the SIB inherited the
responsibility to provide investor protection and to promote market efficiency and
competitive equality).
75. See Thorpe, supra note 24, at 165 (noting that the FSA brings together nearly twenty regulatory bodies); Creaven, supra note 73, at S294 (noting that RPBs are
professionals who carry out investment activities ancillary to their actual profession).
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Kingdom Government required the SIB to maintain the internal structure
of the regulatory system through the process of authorization,76 to supervise the statutory regulations, to act as a general investigator and
enforcer, and to provide sound and prudent advice. 7 Additionally, the
United Kingdom Government required the SROs, s which formed the
other half of the two-tier system, to preserve self-regulation within the
industry and to monitor their members for unfair and lenient treat-

ment.79
Despite its modest attempts at providing statutory regulation, the FSA
received criticisms that the new rules were too "detailed" and "legalistic."8" Consequently, the Chairman of the SIB, David Walker, presented
a program in 1989 called the "New Settlement '"' to address emerging
problems. 2 He proposed a three-tiered framework system of regulation

76. See Regulatory System. supra note 68, at 4 (explaining that a firm can obtain
authorization by registering directly with the SIB or by membership in one of the
recognized SROs). This authorization process lies at the heart of the FSA. Id.
77. Id. at 10-11.
78. See Brayne, supra note 23, at 53 (listing the following organizations as current SRO's in the United Kingdom: Financial Intermediaries, Managers, and Brokers
Regulatory Association (FIMBRA), which consists of members who provide advice
and perform transactions in life assurance and "units in authorized unit trusts;" Life
Assurance and Unit Trust Regulatory Organization (LAUTRO), which consists of
members who transact in insurance units and in regulated collective investment
schemes, Investment Management Regulatory Organization (IMRO), which consists of
members who manage 'investment transactions and regulated unit trusts, investment
trusts, and pension funds; and. SIB Regulatory Organization (SIBRO), which consists
of members directly supervised by the SIB); see also Federal Securities & Corporate
Developments, 25 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 758 [hereinafter Federal Securities] (maintaining that the Securities and Futures Association is the most effective SRO).
79. See Regulatory System, supra note 68, at 11 (explaining the SRO's responsibilities).
80. Thorpe, supra note 24, at 169-74. Critics called for more effective control of
risk (systematic, market, broker, client); less structural overlap and underlap; and a
reduction of unnecessary costs. See London's Regulatory Mess, THE ECONOMIST, May
29, 1993, at 15 (emphasizing that the FSA was an ineffective approach to regulation);
JOHN

R.C.

WHITE, REGULATION OF SECURITIES AND FUTURES

DEALING

1

(1992)

(suggesting that the rules were too intrusive and burdensome).
81. See WHrrE, supra note 80, at I (stating that the New Settlement sought to
achieve the harmonization of self-regulation within a statute-based framework of regulation); Thorpe, supra note 24, at 167 (noting that the suggestions proposed in the
New Settlement resembled the original assertions espoused by Gower).
82. See Thorpe, supra note 24. at 166; Dan Atkinson, Old System Bequeathes A
Legacy of Squabbling, THE GUARDIAN, May 26, 1993, at 11 (illustrating that during
the 1980s, the financial services community experienced frequent fraudulent investment
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consisting of a top tier listing ten Principles, a second tier designating
Core Rules, and a third tier describing SRO rules. 3
C. COMPANIES ACT OF 1989

As part of the New Settlement, the Government of the United Kingdom passed the Companies Act of 1989 to encourage the SIB and the
SROs to redraft their rules.' While the act called for several changes
affecting the financial services sector,85 it focused on the redrafting of
§ 62A of the FSA, which clarified the problematic area concerning a
private investor's right to file a civil right of action.86 Also, in the
activity and noting that, in addition to fraud, FIMBRA experienced financial difficulties); see also Norma Cohen, supra note 5, at 1 (recalling that one cause of the
Maxwell scandal was the failure of the SROs to maintain adequate supervisory rules).
83. See Thorpe, supra note 24, at 167 (indicating that the proposed three-tiered
system appeared to complicate rather than facilitate the current system and emphasizing that due to duplication and waste the proposed system was not cost-effective).
The tier structure subjected a single business activity to at least three different layers
of regulation, each with different legal emphasis and significance. Id.; see also Big
Test For Large Ambition, FIN. TIMES, May 26, 1993 [hereinafter Large Ambition]
(stating that the New Settlement, although interpreted as a more relaxed approach to
regulation, actually produced an unnecessary rivalry between the SIB and SROs).
84. See WHITE, supra note 80, at 2; Changes Introduced by the Companies Act
1989, FIN. REG. REP., Dec. 1989 [hereinafter Companies Act 1989] (stating that Parliament ratified the act upon receiving the Royal Assent on Nov. 16, 1989).
85. Companies Act 1989, supra note 84. The ten parts and twenty-four schedules
of the Act discuss the amendments to the FSA. Id. Part I discusses the 1985 Companies act sections concerning company accounts. Id. Specifically, this section broadens
the definition of parent and subsidiary undertakings in order to compel the disclosure
of off-balance sheet financing. Id. Part II governs the rules concerning the supervision
of auditors. Id. Part III addresses the powers given to inspectors for investigating
overseas regulators and facilitates the acquisition of confidential and restricted information. Id. Part IV addresses guidelines about the registration of company charges. Id.
Part V implements changes to current company law. Id. Part VI amends the Fair
Trading Act of 1973. and includes criminal penalties for fraudulent activity. Id. Part
VII addresses investment exchanges and clearing houses. Id. Part VIII covers amendments to the Financial Services Act. Id. Part IX introduces the issuance of securities
without the need of a written instrument. Id. Part X covers general amendments not
mentioned specifically in the other nine parts. Id. See WHITE, supra note 80, at 4
(noting that these changes benefited SROs by catering to their operating environment
and specific clients). Critics argued that SROs lacked sufficient power to design rules
to benefit the types of investment business it authorized and regulated and that the
structure prevented an SRO from devising rules to account for its sophisticated members. Id. This change eliminates duplicative procedures from exchange rules and SRO
rules. Id.
86. See WHITE, supra note 80, at 2-3. (acknowledging that the amended section
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spring of 1990, the SIB carried out the proposal under the New Settlement' to issue the Statements of Principle,"8 'ten fundamental rules applicable to all members of SROs, firms and RPBs.89
In addition to the Principle Rules, the SIB created Core Rules to deal
with financial resources," conduct of business," client money92 and
62A clarified and reduced the prosaic list of FSA rules). Previously, the FSA received
criticisms for its broad scope which extended the right of action to "anyone who
suffered loss as a result of a contravention by the SIB's or SROs' rules, even if he
did not have a direct customer relationship with the firm responsible for the rule
breach and even if he was another large investment house rather than an individual."
Id. at 1; Regulation Is Too Detailed, Bus. L. BRIEF (Dec. 1989) [hereinafter Regulation Detailed] (noting that critics argued, prior to the Amendments, the different procedures followed by the SIB, SROs, and RPBs regarding the right of action for investors created 'regulatory arbitrage'); WHITE, supra note 80, at 118 (indicating that
the change compelled SROs like the Securities and Futures Authority to redefine
'private customer' as one who does not perform investment business or does not
qualify as an expert investor).
87. See Regulation Detailed, supra note 86 (stating that the confusion raised by
market participants regarding consumer protection and market regulation compelled the
SIB to devise a system of specific rules).
88. See WHITE, supra note 80, at 5. Many industry professionals refer to the ten
Principles as the "Ten Commandments" for investment business because they delineate
fundamental guidelines for business firms and investors. Id. The Prinriples have been
termed the foundation to the revised FSA of 1986. Statement of Principles Effective
May 1, SIB Says, INT'L SEC. REG. REP., June 4, 1990. All SROs and RPBs are subject to the rules that can be waived only if the SIB determines that compliance
would unduly burden a party and if investors face minimal risk. Id.
89. See WHITE, supra note 80, at 5 (observing that the Principles also established
moral and ethical standards). In 1991, five SFA firms were reprimanded for violating
Principle 3 because they failed to observe high standards of market conduct while
transacting in London Futures and Options Exchange's property index futures contracts. Id. Other rules violated by the firms but overshadowed by Principle 3 were the
Core rules and .third tier SRO/RPB rules. Id.
90.' See WHITE, supra note 80, at 6-7. (observing that the first Core Rules" were
enacted on August 1, 1990, to govern whether a firm possesses adequate financial
resources; specifically, the Core Rules deal with financial resources, records and reporting, internal controls and systems, ad hoe reporting, and auditing).
91. WHITE, supra note 80, at 387. There were 40 Core Conduct of Business
Rules enacted by the SIB on January 30, 1991, to provide greater uniformity to the
financial services industry. Id. The commencement date arrives on a rolling basis,
depending on when an SRO completes its third tier rulemaking. Id. at 7. For example, the Investment Management Regulatory Organization was subject to the Core
Rules on November 30, 1991, when its rulebook finally came into force and the
Securities and Futures Authority fell under these Rules dn April 1, 1992, when it
completed its new rulebook. Id.
92. See WHITE, supra note 80, at 319. (explaining that there are two sets of
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unsolicited calls. 3 One fundamental difference between the Principles
and the Core Rules was that the Core Rules applied only to investment
businesses supervised by SROs and not RPBs.94 The creation of these
Principles and Rules highlighted the importance for each SRO to devise
its rules at its third tier level with specificity and in accordance with the
other two-tiers.95
D.

THE LARGE REPORT.

In light of the problems unveiled by the numerous scandals of the
1980s and early 1990s,96 including the infamous Robert Maxwell af-

regulations under this Core Rule, the main set (The Financial Services (Client money)
Regulations 1991) and the Supplementary set (The Financial Services (Client Money)
Supplementary Regulations 1991); the SIB enacted both sets on January 1, 1992,
pursuant to section 55 of the FSA 1986 and subsequently amended by Consultative
Paper 61 in March 1992 and the Rules attempt to safeguard client funds by placing
them in a trust).
93. WHITE, supra note 80, at 7. These rules came into effect on January 1,
1992, pursuant to section 56 of the FSA of 1986. Id. There are a total of 20 rules
referring to marketing restrictions and dealing restrictions. Id. Section 56 distinguished
marketing restrictions, defined as "relating to unsolicited calls to enter into an
agreement", with dealing restrictions, defined as "the restriction on entering into an
investment agreement in the course of, or in consequence of, an unsolicited call." Id.
at 231.
94. See WHITE, supra note 80, at 8 (noting that even when applicable to SROs,
the Core Rules are limited to transactions that are under the direct supervision of and
regulation by an SRO; in other words, if a firm is subject to two regulatory bodies
(i.e., a SRO and the Bank of England), the Core Rules apply only to those activities
performed under the jurisdiction of the SRO). RPB members lobbied hard to exclude
themselves from the jurisdiction of the Core Rules. Id. They argued that because their
investment business was ancillary to their everyday activity and were already subject
to effective regulation elsewhere, the Core Rules would create unnecessary duplication.
Id. The Institute of Actuaries, however, are subject to the Core Rules on Client Money Regulations, because the institute is licensed to conduct investment transactions. Id.
at 319.
95. See Robin Brooks & Martin Coleman, Protection or Confusion?, THE TIMES,
Jan. 9, 1990 (Features) (noting that suggested amendments to the FSA, which allowed
individual SROs to add their own layers of regulation, created an unnecessary series
of rules to add to existing regulations that already confuse investors seeking protection).
96. See McNeil, supra note 5, at 6 (1993) (illustrating that scandals marring the
London markets include: the problems experienced by FIMBRA, LAUTRO, and
SIBRO; financial services regulators concerning the sale of home income planning;
and the London FOX scandal, where FOX's staff members engaged in fraudulent
transactions with firms of the newly-founded property futures market).
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fair,97 the Chancellor of the Exchequer in July 1992 asked Andrew
Large, Chairman of the SIB, to prepare a report examining the regulatory responsibilities of the SIB and the regulatory structure itself.98 This
request confirmed the growing concerns about the inadequate level of
investor protection provided under the current system." From the beginning of the implementation of the FSA, critics noted that the speed
with which the current regulatory system was implemented, concomitant
with the establishment of new organizations and the unfamiliarity of
statutory regulation, created a confusing atmosphere that compelled
participants to conform to cryptic rules."° In his report, Large noted
that the primary criticisms expressed by market participants were that: i)
the objectives of the Act are unclear;'' ii) too much fraud goes unpunished due to the negligence of regulators;0 2 iii) the system is too
complex;0 3 iv) the regulation of exchanges and markets is imprecisely

97. See McNeil, supra note 5, at 6 (indicating that the Maxwell Affair illustrated
the weaknesses of the U.K. regulatory system).
98. Large, supra note 4, at 1. The Chancellor of the Exchequer asked Large to
examine the workings of the SIB under the FSA, particularly the SIB's supervision of
the recognized bodies. Id.
99. Large, supra note 4, at 2. Large stated that current regulations did not ensure
adequately that the system favored the investor, detected fraudulent activity, reprimanded fraudsters, and minimized costs. Id. While he acknowledged that this industry
requires a level of market risk, he insisted upon regulation that guaranteed protection.
which supposedly already was addressed by the FSA. Id.
100. Large. supra notd 4, at 6: see Diana Wright, SIB at Work, SUNDAY TIMES.
May 30, 1993 (Features) (indicating that producers and consumers of the financial
services industry have voiced dissatisfaction with the FSA system for over six years);
Robert Peston, Large Urges Clampdown on Investment Fraud: Calls for a Regulatory
System That Can Prevent a Recurrence of Events Like the Robert Maxivell Pensions
Scandal, FIN. TIMES, May 26, 1993, at 8 (noting that Large expected the confusion
arising from the FSA, because the act regulated a large network of participants; including twenty recognized regulatory bodies and 28,000 firms; employed over 300,000
to perform investment activity; and has been modified and rewritten many times since
its recent implementation to resolve the problematic provisions).
101. See Large, supra note 4, at 17 (illustrating the confusion that existed as to
whether the FSA's primary goal was investor protection or market efficiency). People
complained that regulators over-emphasized quick adaptation rules rather than improve
the act to work within the actual environment. Id.
102. See Large, supra note 4, at 17. (asserting that recent events indicate increasing levels of fraud and the inadequacy of the regulatory system to attack fraud and
punish offenders); SIB Chairman Outlines Reform. supra note 5 (stating that Large
sought to erradicate the fraudulent activity performed by misguided participants).
103. See Large, supra note 4, at 18 (indicating that the plethora of rulebooks
confused customers on a variety of issues, including whom to contact for redress).
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defined;" v) suspicion exists that self-regulation is synonymous with
self-interest; 5 vi) the compensation scheme is structured inappropriately and the funding scheme is unfair; ' 6 vii) the retail area is ineffectively regulated; 7 viii) the regulation of professionals is still not distinguished sufficiently from regulation of the retail market;0 8 and ix)
cost-effectiveness is not evident."°
To restore investor protection while remaining market-sensitive, Large
concluded that reworking the two-tiered structure " established by the
FSA was a better solution than redesigning the entire system."' While
critics recommended a single regulatory agency,"' Large rejected this
Also, the different bodies failed to work together but rather worked in "particular
patches." Id.
104. See Large, supra note 4, at 19 (noting specific criticisms about the SIB conceming the clarity of its role, its method of supervising the recognized bodies, uncertainty of its enforcement powers, and its lack of adequate funding, support mechanisms, permanence and precedent).
105. See Large, supra note 4, at 17 (stating that participants debated about the
relative value of a two-tier system as compared to a unitary one); Peston, supra note
100, at 8 (asserting that a two-tier system would allow SROs to escape central regulation).
106. See Large, supra note 4, at 17 (recognizing individuals' complaints that good
investors should not have to compensate for bad investors and that the compensation
scheme itself was not generous toward investors); SIB Chairman Outlines Reform,
supra note 5 (stating that Large seeks to remedy the slow system of compensation for
good-faith investors).
107. Large, supra note 4, at 18.
108. See Large, supra note 4, at 18 (suggesting that the wholesale sector seeks
greater distinction from the retail sector and a clearer means to avoid compensation
for liabilities from which they should be exempt); Peston, supra note 100, at 8 (stating that the report seeks to balance the under-regulated retail business sector with the
over-regulated professional business sector).
109. See Large, supra note 4, at 17 (noting that participants questioned the high
levels of cost and the failure of regulators to take action to lower them).
110. See Large, supra note 4, § 1.12, at 22 (explaining that the two-tiered system
consists of a "senior regulator," responsible for voicing the concerns of the public,
and a "frontline regulator," responsible for protecting ifivestors directly). The Government directed and delegated powers to the senior regulator while the frontline regulators reacted to market developments and interacted with their members daily to deal
with routine problems and issues. Id.; Federal Securities, supra note 78, at 758 (recalling that a spokeswoman for the SIB reconfirmed the two-tier system as the most
effective means to make self-regulation work).
111. Large. supra note 4, § 1.12. at 22. See Clifford Chance, UK: The Large Report, in EC FrN. SERVS. NEWSL. 10 (1993) [hereinafter Large Report] (reiterating that
the Chancellor agreed with Large that a total restructuring of the system was not
appropriate and currently would be detrimental to the financial services industry).
112. See Large, supra note 4, § 1.15, at 4, 23 (stating that a unitary system
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suggestion because he believed that the elimination of a two-tiered approach would create a more bureaucratic environment that was less
sensitive to market needs."' In summary, his report listed ten key areas for reform"4 and issued proposals recommending that the SIB finetune its regulation and that SROs regulate the market directly."'
Large's first proposal concerns the publication by the SIB and the
recognized bodies of their statement of objectives in order to introduce a
greater level of clarity and understanding of the FSA system."6 Addi-

would combine the roles of the SIB, SROs and the RIEs and RPBs into one unitary
regulator and therefore may result in more effective regulation through consolidation
of differing roles of the various institutions); Peter Montagnon, New Teeth for the
Watchdogs, FIN. TIMES, June 22, 1993, at III (stating that James Fishman, a U.S. law
professor, suggested that the SIB should evolve into a statutory-based commission
similar to the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)).
113. See Large Report, supra note 111, at 10 (stating that proposals for a unitary
regulatory system with a mandated statutory foundation were never considered); Andrew Large Discusses Recent and Planned Regulatory Reforms, INT'L SEC. REG. REP.,
Nov. 30, 1993 [hereinafter Andrew Large Discussion] (noting that Large responded to
the Labour Party's recommendations for a SEC-type body to regulate the industry by
commenting that his policy is bringing and can continue to bring about an SEC-like
structure without creating new and excessive legislative changes).
114. See Large, supra note 4, § 1.64, at 34 (suggesting that the system required
specific modifications including "a more explicit commitment by SIB to the objective
of investor protection; emphasis by SIB on setting the standards for recognised bodies
and of firms in pursuing that objective; devising of performance measures to enable
the performance of the system to be evaluated; a switch of emphasis by SIB from
rules and policy to supervision; a more systematic and active supervisory relationship
between SIB and recognised bodies; enforcement leadership by SIB, both to support
its supervisory role and to ensure that the required standards of investor protection are
delivered; greater attention to cost-effectiveness; a clear retreat by SIB from direct
regulation; much greater transparency about the system-its objectives, its ways of
working, its standards, its performance; changes in SIB's organisation, and assurance
of the appropriate resources, both at SIB and system-wide").
115. See ANDREA M. CORCORAN, REGULATION AND DEREGULATION OF THE U.S.
FINANCIAL MARKETS: A FIN DE SIECLE PERSPECTIVE 27 (1992) (arguing that
self-regulation alone is not enough for effective regulation); McNeil. supra note 5, at
6 (stating that the SIB will discontinue its direct regulation of nearly eighty firms
who are subsidiaries of large building societies and banking groups that perform retail
investment transactions); Peston, supra note 100, at 3 (indicating that Large feels that
direct regulation by the SIB was necessary during the initial stages of the FSA but is
no longer necessary in today's financial environment). SROs should directly regulate
the industry and the SIB should intervene only when SROs are unable to perform
their functions effectively. Id.
116. Large, supra note 4, § 2.2, at 36. The statement shall include the standards
of behavior of SIBs, recognized bodies, and regulated firms. Id. Specifically, SIB shall
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tionally, the public distribution of SIB's and the recognized bodies'
statements of objectives can raise more effectively the level of market
participant awareness of the regulatory system." 7 Upon clarifying the
objectives of the FSA system, the SIB can proceed to set its standards
for regulation.' In addition, the SIB should state with particularity the
standards of investor protection." 9 Large suggests that to ensure both
standards work properly, the industry should introduce performance measures 120 which detail and identify its progress and achievements."
To assist the recognized bodies in satisfying their requirements, the
SIB should create new and more effective methods of notification."
To guarantee the accuracy of submitted information, the SIB must devel-

outline its supervisory, investigative and enforcement powers to ensure the compliance
of its standards. Id. The recognized bodies' issuance of their statement of objectives
shall complement the SIB to enforce their role as frontline regulators. Id. at 37.
117. Large, supra note 4, at 11.
118. Large, supra note 4, § 3.8, at 39. Large stated that the SIB's responsibility
in setting standards is to give "practical meaning to the high level objectives." Id. §
3.7. He defines standards of regulation as standards that illustrate the performance
expected from recognized bodies, so that the SIB and investors are made aware of
their activity. Id. § 3.8. By setting the standards, the SIB can articulate clearly its
application and interpretation of the Act. Id. at 40; see Peston, supra note 100, at 8
(indicating that Mr. Large encouraged the SIB to seek a more pro-active role in setting the standards of regulation that recognized bodies should follow).
119. See Large, supra note 4, §§3.11-3.12, at 40 (stating that standards of investor
protection safeguard customers from hazards such as the lack of segregation of funds,
inadequate risk disclosure, unfamiliarity with the client, and the misappropriation of
client funds). These hazards can be overlooked by standards of regulation. Id.
120. See Large, supra note 4, § 3.17, at 42 For standards of regulation, typical
performance measures include mechanisms to monitor the frequency of visits; measure
the duration of complaint-handling times; determine methods for disciplinary punishment; and minimize default occurrences. Id. For standards of investor protection. typical mechanisms include methods to assess levels of suitability and "know your client"
rules, and ways tO investigate client money segregation requirements. Id. §3.18.
121. See Large, supra note 4, § 3.16, at 42 (explaining that performance measures
are defined as "outputs of the system, or activity indicators, or concrete events, which
give, or provide a reliable proxy for, objective measures or indicators of performance"); Large Ambition, supra note 83 (stating that SIB's role should include setting
performance standards for its SROs).
122. Large, supra note 4, § 4.9(i), at 46-47. Currently, rules 14.21 and 41 govern
notification requirements from recognized bodies to the SIB. In light of these recommendations and the outdated state of the current rules implemented in 1987-88. Large
suggests an update to rules 14.21 and 41. Id. Some recommendations include notification regarding possible trouble areas and refined submission of pertinent information
to replace superfluous information. Id. at 47.
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op an on-site checking process to verify the information supplied by
recognized bodies" 3 and visit them periodically. 4 The SIB and recognized' bodies should pursue better communication through formal
board review meetings and bilateral staff meetings."n Based on these
visits and reviews, the SIB must2 publish
a report assessing the level of
6
performance of regulated bodies.
Because the FSA specifically limited the enforcement powers of the
SIB, the SIB needs to maximize its legislatively created enforcement
powers to increase compliance with regulation. 7 The act, however,
prevents the SIB from appointing officers for recognized bodies directly
and from imposing punitive damages.' Nevertheless, even though the
division of power preserves equality between the two tiers, the FSA
system will require a backup enforcement mechanism, as in the United

States,

9

to serve as an incentive for firms' compliance with existing

rules and thereby avoid SIB intervention. 3 Large warns that if the
present practice continues to be ineffective, he will recommend alternatives to the Chancellor that would transfer direct enforcement powers to

the SIB.'
123. See Peston, supra note 100, at 8; Large, supra note 4, § 4.9(iii), at 47 (noting that recognized bodies shall submit an annual management plan containing projected targets for periodic review before SIB visits the sites). This process will eliminate
duplicative efforts by the SIB and the recognized bodies. Id.
124. Peston. supra note 100, at 8 (contending that regular visits facilitate the
process of supervision).
125. Peston, supra note 100, at 8 (explaining that previously, recognized bodies
had no direct access for consultation with the SIB Board).
126. Large, supra note 4, § 4.9(ix), at 48.
127. See Large, supra note 4, § 4.15(i), at 50 (explaining that currently, SIB can
ask the High Court to compel compliance from recognized bodies and it can ask to
revoke the license of recognized bodies; Regulatory Reform, supra note 5, at 9 (indicating that the SIB needs to become more involved in enforcement activities).
128. See Large, supra note 4, § 4,15(i), at 50 (explaining that more defined powers would have allowed the SIB to enforce its rules more effectively).
129. See Large, supra note 4, § 4.19, at 53 (explaining that the SEC in the United States has greater power to enforce regulated firms as well as parties such as corporations that exist outside the securites industry). These powers, an interplay of civil
and criminal proceedings, serve as an incentive for participants to practice in good
faith. Id.
130. See Large, supra note 4, § 4.15(iv), at 52 (suggesting that the SIB may intervene to instruct SROs how .to deal with member firms whenever it feels that a
problem has been handled improperly); Cohen, supra note 5, at 1 (indicating that the
SIB should intervene in enforcement cases that it deems important and should measure the performance of enforcement activity in reviewing SROs).
131. Large, supra note 4, § 4.20, at 53; see Cohen, supra note 5, at 1 (empha-
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Large argues that without proper enforcement mechanisms,' 32 the
standards and regulations will become obsolete.'33 As a result, he recommends that the SIB take a leadership position in the enforcement area
to complement its supervisory role."' For example, in certain circumstances, such as when it is necessary to "police the perimeter" and to
prosecute offenders,'35 the SIB should exercise its powers independently from recognized bodies and use sections 59136 and 60' of the

sizing that the SROs must cooperate with the SIB to ensure the success of new regulatory proposals, but if the proposals fail the SIB should impose alternatives); SIB
Chairman Outlines Reform, supra note 5 (indicating that the Large Report is the last
effort to establish a successful self-regulatory system). Large has warned that if his
recommendations fail to remedy problems, complete statutory regulation will be the
next step. Id.
132. See Large, supra note 4, at 55 (explaining that proper enforcement mechanisms gather information, survey transactions, investigate, intervene to restrict or suspend, impose fines and other disciplinary actions, and provide restitution for the injured).
133. Large, supra note 4, § 5.2, at 55. But Cf. McNeil, supra note 5, at 6 (stating that the Securities and Futures Authority believes that increasing enforcement
activity by the SIB will become disruptive and intrusive).
134. Large, supra note 4, § 5.5, at 56. SIB needs to take charge in those situations where SROs lack sufficient power, multiple parties are involved, and a regulator has asked directly for SIB's help. Id. at § 5.7.
135. See Large, supra note 4, § 5.9, at 57 (emphasizing that currently, the SIB
can enforce activity other than fraud). In these situations, the SIB exercises its rights
under sections 6 and 61 of the Act, which enable it to request injunctions or restitution from both authorized and unauthorized investment business. Id. To deal with
fraudulent cases, SIB can use its civil powers to inform the police or SFA, who then
can take action. Id.
136. See Large, supra note 4, § 5.10, at 57 (noting that section 59 enables SIB to
ban participants from engaging in further investment activity). The SIB has never
exercised this power under Section 59 because of disproportionate costs but recent
discussions suggest that section 59 should be used more frequently. Id. See also, SIB
weighs use of draconian powers, THE TELEGRAPH, Aug. 15, 1993 (indicating that
since being mentioned in the Large Report, the SIB has investigated how it effectively can apply section 59 without burdening the industry and how it can overcome the
legal complexities); Lisa Vaughan, SIB moves to strenghen its investor protection
powers: Watchdog will be able to disqualify 'unfit' people from employment as part
of campaign to crack down on fraud, THE INDEP., Sept. 17, 1993, at 27 (stating that
on September 16, the SIB expanded the use of section 59 by incorporating the regulation of unfit persons under section 59 powers). Currently, 50 employees review
section 59 cases as part of the SIB's enforcement practices. Id. A spokeswoman for
the SIB stated that this expansion can serve as a warning to all agents that they are
subject to closer scrutiny and that misinformation to regulators falls under the definition of "unfitness." Id. Disqualification bans firms from employing persons who are
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Act more regularly. In addition, the SIB should lead inter-regulator issues' by facilitating the level of cooperation among U.K. regulatory
bodies.'3 9 Commentators have suggested creating a central "policeman"
to combat fraud, market manipulation, and insider trading. 40 While
many issues must be resolved for a central policeman to become effective, the Government should
consider the SIB for this position if the
14
proposal gains plausibility.

To implement these changes successfully, SIB actions must be more
transparent and publicly accessible. 4 1 Increased transparency will help
to bring about a sense of investor confidence and will better illustrate to
the public that both the SIB and SROs are performing according to the

designated as "unfit." Id. See also Andrew Large Discussion. supra note 113 (indicating that Large commented that the revised use of section 59 will promote efficiency
by detecting malfeasance or misuse by market participants).
137. See Large, supra note 4, § 5.11, at 57-58 (explaining that section 60 grants
SIB the power to criticize publicly authorized persons). Persons not authorized directly
by the SIB can escape this clause. Id. Since the power is restricted to only a small
portion of the investment community, Large recommends an expansion of this right.
Id. See also Sara McCommell, Building Society Rebuked by SIB Over Investments,
THE TIMEs, Oct. 7, 1993 (stating that since the Large Report, the SIB successfully
has used section 60 of the FSA to criticize publically the North of England Building
Society). This is the first time that the SIB has utilized section 60 since Large accepted the position of Chairman of the SIB. Id. North of England provoked this action by failing to study the financial background of its customers and by encouraging
them to purchase various policies without providing them with adequate information
and advice. Id.
138. See Large, supra note 4, § 5.12, at 58 (explaining that schedule 7, paragraph
5 of the FSA assigns the SIB the responsibility of guiding regulators within the domestic and international forum).
139. Large, supra note 4, § 5.13, at 58-59. There shall be increases in the level
of transparency and information-sharing between FSA and non-FSA authorities, and in
developing remedies for cross-jurisdictional problems.
140. Large, supra note 4, § 5.18. at 60. See Paul Durman, SIB Expected To Ask
For Limit On Its Powers, THE INDEPENDENT, May 24, 1993, at 20 (revealing that the
Chairman of the Stock Exchange, Andrew Hugh Smith, has encouraged the creation
of an enforcement body to address problems raised by insider trading and other abuses).
141. Large, supra note 4, at 61. Before a central policeman program is implemented, the question of who has jurisdiction over the affair-the criminal prosecutor, the
SIB, a regulated body, or a combination of civil and criminal authorities-must be
resolved. Id.
142. See Large, supra note 4, at 83-84 (indicating that the publication of information will encourage the public to express its opinions and debate the regulatory issues).
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Rules." 3 Because both the SIB and the recognized bodies shall publish
reports addressing their objectives,'
management plan, 4 ' perfor4
mance indicators, ' and operational reviews, market participants can
understand better the rules and apply them more effectively. 7 Finally,
Large encourages the creation of the Personal Investment Authority
(PIA) to serve as the SRO supervising all retail financial services. 8
Large's recommendations illustrate a pending increase in regulatory
behavior by the United Kingdom Government. 9 From a minimal

143. Large, supra note 4, at 83. Reports will include insights as to whether the
SIB deals effectively with fraud, its resources, the recognized bodies, and enforcing
compliance. Id.
144. Large, supra note 4, at 84. The statement of objectives shall clarify the functions and powers of the SIB and the recognized bodies. Id.
145. Large, supra note .4, at 84. The plan shall address SIB's annual projected
targets and its results compared to previous targets. Id.
146. Large, supra note 4, at 84. The publication of performance indicators provides the participants with direct exposure of SIB's and SROs' objectives and performance. Id.
147. Large, supra note 4, at 84. By producing specialized reports on various activities, the participants can become better aware of SIB's performance and help
strengthen investor confidence. Id.
148. Large, supra note 4, at 100. See Sarah Whitebloom, Financial Advisers Face
Rules that they can drive quietly past, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 2, 1993, at 34 (noting
that the Personal Investment Authority (PIA) replaces LAUTRO, which supervises life
companies, and FIMBRA, which supervises independent advisers); Large Report, supra
note 111, at 11 (stating that the formation. of the PIA can abolish the inefficiencies,
restructure a system of compensation, and resolve fiduciaries' problems); Durman. supra note 140, at 20 (stating that SIB's direct regulation of building societies and "life
insurance arms of the banks" have challenged the formation of the PIA. which was
designed to protect private investors); McNeil, supra note 5, at 6 (indicating that
banks are dissatisfied with the government's ultimatum compelling them to join PIA
and become subject to tighter regulation); Cohen, supra note 5, at 1 (indicating that
the success of the PIA depends on the banks and the building societies joining the
PIA because the life insurance industry has threatened to boycott the PIA if banks
fail to join). The success of the PIA to supervise activity in the retail financial sector
is critical to the overall success of Large's proposals. Id.; see Matthew Doull.
NatWest Chief in Key Post at SIB, THE TELEGRAPH, Nov. 26, 1993, at 27 [hereinafter NatWest Chief] (noting that Colette Bowe, who the SIB appointed as the chief
executive of the PIA, agreed that the current structure of self-regulation backed by
statute was the most workable system).
149. See Sarah Whitebloom and Dan Atkinson, City Regulator's Takeover Bid; SIB
Chiefs Report Makes a Play To Oversee Policing in Huge Rethink on Surveillance of
Financial Malpractice, THE GUARDIAN, May 26, 1993, at 11 (stating that Anthony
Nelson, the Economic Secretary to the Treasury, noted that Large's recommendations
represent the furthest movement away from self-regulation under the current system).
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statutory-based regulatory system supervised by the Bank of England
and a temporary deregulatory period under the "Big Bang," the Large
Report seeks to fine-tune the current rules implemented under the FSA,
the first significant statutory-based regulatory system in the United Kingdom. 5 ' By outlining of the rules and strengthening of the powers of
the SIB and SROs, the United Kingdom can restore waning investor
confidence and encourage investors to participate in U.K. markets without fear of confronting the sort of scandalous activity exhibited in the
recent Maxwell Affair.'5'
IV. REGULATORY CHANGES IN THE COMMODITY FUTURES
TRADING COMMISSION
The increasing internationalization of the commodities market illus-

trates how existing CFTC rules burden many market participants with
excessive requirements and unnecessary costs. As a result, with the
recommendations suggested by the Working Groups' of the Regulato-

Nelson believes that the proposals will significantly restrict the activity of SROs. Id.;
Federal Securities, supra note 78, at 758 (stating that Alistair Darling, Labour's City
spokesman, suggested that self-regulation in its current form should be eliminated).
Darling also criticized the Large Report as being tentative and not as far reaching as
it could have been. Id. See also Montagnon, supra note 112, at In (indicating that
the United Kingdom faces a choice between statutory regulation or self-regulation).
Mr. Fishman, a U.S. law professor, suggests that the United Kingdom prefers a
self-regulatory system because it follows the tradition of the financial services industry
in England and provides the flexibility to adapt to current market trends and practices. Id.
150. See After Big Bang, Watch Out for Guy Fawkes Day, THE ECONOMIST, Oct.
25, 1986, at 87 (describing that the FSA is comparable to the creation of the U.S.
securities laws resulting from the Great Depression). See also supra note 73 (discussing the "Big Bang").
151. McNeil, supra note 5, at 6.
152. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS,
MARKET REFORM ACT OF 1990 42 (1992) [hereinafter Executive Summary]. Working
groups comprised of Regulatory Coordination Advisory Committee (RCAC) members,
which include industry professionals as well as academics and attorneys, meet to
discuss market issues such as speculative position limits, clearance and settlement,
managed funds, and international competitiveness. Id. at 41. The Managed Funds
Working Group has raised over thirty issues including disclosure regulations. Id. at
42. The Working Group on Speculative Limits has presented proposals recommending
the appropriate level of speculative position limits including interim levels. Id. at 43.
The Working Group on International Competitiveness focused on ways to strengthen
rules governing new contracts and products. Id. The Working Group on Clearance and
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ry Coordination Advisory Committee (RCAC)' 53 the Commission has
pursued deregulatory programs in the areas of risk disclosure, speculative position limits and exemption status for foreign futures and options
transactions. The examination of each rule highlights the changes implemented to broaden aid open U.S. markets.'54 Moreover, an examination of each rule supports arguments made by market participants that
antiquated and barrier-like regulations prevent effective international
competition."'
A.
Several

CFTC

rules,

RISK DISCLOSURE

specifically

rules

1.55,156

30.6,'

and

33.7,58 compel merchants and traders to satisfy risk disclosure require-

Settlement studied the effects of banking practices and their effects on the futures
market. Id.
153. See id. at 41 (explaining that the CFrC created the RCAC to improve and
modify the rules and regulations governing commodities futures and options). RCAC's
first meeting took place on September 26, 1990, and it has met an additional six
times. Id. at 42. At the meetings, the RCAC sought: to identify duplicative regulation
among agencies; to institute methods for increased information sharing concerning
enforcement, market trends, and financial risk among regulators; to improve credit
clearing and payment systems among market members; and to obtain access to new
markets for market participants. Id. at 41-42.
154. See Jack R.S. Revell, The Complementary Nature of Competition and Regulation in the Financial Sector, in COMPETITION AND REGULATION IN FINANCIAL MARKETS 16, 17 (Albert Verheirstraeten ed.. 1981) (suggesting that the financial system in
the United States has been governed by an excessive overload of structural regulation).
155. Albrecht, supra note 24, at 7.
156. Distribution of "Risk Disclosure Statement" by Futures Commission Merchants
and Introducing Brokers, 17 C.F.R. § 1.55 (1993). Rule 1.55 compels futures commission merchants (FCMs) or introducing brokers (IBs) to issue risk disclosure statements
and to receive a signed acknowledgment statement from the customer before opening
an account for a domestic futures customer. Id. See generally Protection of Commodity Customers; Risk Disclosure by Futures Commission Merchants and Introducing Brokers to Customers; Baiakruptcy Disclosure, 57 Fed. Reg. 46,101 (1992) [hereinafter 57
Fed. Reg. 46101] (stating that rule 1.55 serves to warn customers of the risks involved in commodities futures trading).
157. Disclosure, 17 C.F.R. § 30.6 (1993). Rule 30.6 states that a FCM or an IB
may not open customer accounts for foreign futures and options until the FCM or IB
issues a risk disclosure statement and receives a signed acknowledgment statement
from the customer. Id. See also 57 Fed. Reg. 46101, supra note 156, at 46,102 (noting that rule 30.6 serVes to warn customers about trading in foreign futures and options).
158. Disclosure, 17 C.F.R. § 33.7 (1993). Rule 33.7 states that no FCM or IB
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ments. Disclosure is a type of regulation that enables participants to
make informed choices and allows the government to minimize market
manipulation.'5 9 Faced with increased criticisms and market developments which have normalized cross-border trading and electronic trading

systems,"6 the Commission sought to facilitate the opening of accounts
by imposing fewer risk disclosure requirements. 6'
The amendments to rules 1.55, 30.6, and 33.7, adopted on April 5.
1993, and effective on July 1, 1993 include the following provisions:
allow a single rule 1.55 risk disclosure statement for a booklet of accounts, provided that the statement is placed on the cover of the document of the first page of the booklet; consolidate risk disclosure statement requirements for foreign and domestic futures and options ac-

counts; allow single acknowledgment statements by customers and notification to the Commission for bulk transfers; and accept risk disclosure

statements approved by foreign jurisdictions.6 6 The Commission believes that the consolidation of rules 1.55 and 30.6 is a more efficient
method of risk disclosure without sacrificing the intent of the separate
disclosure statements previously required by the two rules. 63 The consolidation no longer requires the specially linked market disclosures re-

may open a commodity options account without the issuance of a risk disclosure
statement. Id.
159. See STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFoRM 162 (1982) (stating that
disclosure ensures purchasers avoid unwanted products and contracts by providing purchasers with knowledge about them).
160. See Protection of Commodity Customers; Risk Disclosure by Futures Commission Merchants and Introducing Brokers to Customers; Bankruptcy Disclosure, 58 Fed.
Reg. 17496 (1993) [hereinafter 58 Fed. Reg. 17495] (stating that the Commission
chose to review proposals and comments submitted by industry professionals and
participants to amend current disclosure requirements).
161. Id.
162. 58 Fed. Reg. 17495, supra note 160, at 17,496. See Rulemaking and Ex-.
change Oversight, 3 CFTC NEWS FEATURE (Commodity Futures Trading Commission,
Washington, D.C.), April 30, 1993. at 3 [hereinafter CFTC NEWS FEATURE], (stating
that the Commission adopted the amendment to consolidate risk disclosure statements
for FCMs and IBs for both domestic and foreign futures and options transactions).
163. 58 Fed. Reg. 17495, supra note 160, at 17,497. The consolidated rule 1.55
does not exempt FCMs and IBs from any other disclosure requirements required by
law. Id. The Commission included a provision in the consolidated rules, which required the use of a statement encouraging customers to inquire about all possible
protection plans before engaging in futures transactions, to accompany the risk disclosure statement. Id. Typical precautionary statements are questions addressing the
high risk level of futures contracts and the remedies available for protection, such as
insurance and disposition of funds. Id.
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quired by some SROs.' 6 Also, the CFTC abolished rule 30.6(a)(2),
which compelled a futures commission merchant (FCM) or introducing
broker (IB) to receive a separate signed acknowledgment statement when
transacting in foreign futures or options, in favor of the consolidated
65

rule.1

The Commission accepted the proposal to incorporate a new subsection, part (c), to rule 1.55 that would allow a risk disclosure statement
approved by a foreign regulatory agency or a SRO to fulfill the requirements of rule 1.55."6 In connection with this new amendment, and at
the urging of international regulators, the Commission is reviewing recommendations concerning the creation of a single risk disclosure statement. 67 If foreign regulators adopt a universal disclosure statement, the
Commission will consider replacing the consolidated rule 1.55 and rule
33.7 on options with the universal disclosure statement. 6
The Commission also decided to adopt "no-action" relief, providing
for a single signature acknowledgment format to satisfy the multiple
separate acknowledgment statements previously required by the Commission. 69 Before this adoption, only "qualified eligible participants"

164. 58 Fed. Reg. 17495, supra note 160, at 17,497. National Futures Association
(NFA) Compliance Rule 2-28, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) Rule 874 and
Commodity Exchange, Inc. Rule 5.14 compel risk disclosure requirements for foreign
futures and options as a result of trading linkages between domestic and foreign futures exchanges. Id. at 17,496 n.7. CME Rule 577 and CBT Rule 9A.20 impose risk
disclosure requirements for users of the GLOBEX electronic trading system and New
York Mercantile Exchange Rule 6.22 imposes them for users of the ACCESS electronic trading system. Id.
165. See 58 Fed. Reg. 17495, supra note 160, at 17,497 (noting that FCMs and
IBs must receive separate acknowledgment statements if the FCM or IB used rules
1.55 and 30.6 separately during the interim period between July 1, 1993 and July 1,
1994).
166. 58 Fed. Reg. 17495, supra note 160, at 17,498. See Susan Ervin, Panel on
FCM Documentation (confirming that rule 1.55(c) allows foreign jurisdictions and
SROs to use their risk disclosure statements); see also 57 Fed. Reg. 46101, supra
note 155, at 46,103 (explaining that trends indicate that increases in cross-border trading have created an excess of duplicative disclosure requirements which increase costs
and hinder efficient processing). The Commission notes, however, that those risks
involved in foreign trading must already be disclosed facially. Id.
167. 58 Fed. Reg. 17495, supra note 160, at 17,497. A universally accepted single
risk disclosure statement could ultimately facilitate transactions in all matters, both
domestic and international. Id.
168. 58 Fed. Reg. 17495, supra note 160, at 17,497.
169. 58 Fed. Reg. 17495, supra note 160, at 17,498. The Division of Trading and
Markets granted the no-action relief to limited categories of highly qualified industry
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defined under rule 4.7(a)(1)(ii), 7' and persons eligible under rule
4.5(a), 7 could exercise the single signature. The primary reason for
the expansion was that separate signatures did not confirm more convincingly a customer's understanding of the contract.'
The Commission also amended rule 190. First, the original Rule
190.06(b) compels a FCM to notify the Commission when it transfers

customer accounts without the customer's approval.'73 Many firms are
aware that they must notify the Commission subsequent to a bankruptcy
filing but are not aware that it applies in other contexts. 74 To remedy
the confusion, the Commission chose to include a statement imposing

this notification requirement in the new rule 1.65.'

Additionally, the

Commission decided to simplify rule 190.10(c)'76 by abolishing the

rule 190.10(c)(1)(ii) acknowledgment requirement.'" Because subchapter IV of chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978"7' covers

customers. Id. The relief enabled FCMs to open customer accounts upon receipt of a
single signature. Id.
170. Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-546, 106 Stat. 3590
(1992), 57 Fed. Reg. 34,853 (1992).
171. See 58 Fed. Reg. 17495, supra note 160, at 17,498 n.14 (describing "eligible
persons" under rule 4.5(a) as: "(1) registered investment companies; (2) state regulated
insurance companies; (3) state or federally regulated financial depository institutions;
and (4) certain pension plans subject to regulation under the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974").
172. 58 Fed. Reg. 17495, supra note 160, at 17,598. Commentators added that
since a customer receives all disclosure statements at the same time, during the process of opening an account, a single signature should suffice under these circumstances. Id.

173.

17 C.F.R. § 190.06(b) (1993).

174. 58 Fed. Reg. 17495, supra note 160, at 17,501.

175. 58 Fed. Reg. 17495, supra note 160, at 17,501. This new rule will warn the
Commission of any bulk transfers projecting financial disaster. Id.
176. 57 Fed. Reg. 46101, supra note 155, at 46,104. Under rule 190.10(c) FCMs
and other commodity brokers who fall under the definition established in Rule
190.01(0, with the exception of clearing organizations, must accept only cash for
purposes of margining, clearing, and securing a futures contract, unless the investor
provides the commodity broker with a disclosure statement delineated in rule
190.10(c)(2). Id. at 46,102. Also, customers must acknowledge their understanding of
that statement. Id. Rule 190.10(c) protects customers, who margin a futures contract
with non-cash deposits, by disclosing an explanation that the return of deposits falls
under the Bankruptcy Code governing pro rata distribution and that the deposit could
be returned only in part. Id.
177. 57 Fed. Reg. 46101, supra note 156, at 46,104.

178. 11 U.S.C. § 761 (1988). This act guarantees that customers receive a pro
rata distribution of liquid and illiquid assets. Id.
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commodity brokers, the Commission stated that the elimination of a
customer's acknowledgment of a risk disclosure statement in this situation will not jeopardize customer protection. 7 9
B.

SPECULATIVE PosIoN LIMITS

The CFTC's actions concerning speculative position limits present
another illustration of the deregulatory trend of the Commission.'O The
Commission recently revised the rules on speculative position limits.'8
In general, the CFTC decided to maintain the current speculative position limit levels for the delivery months, the specified month within
which a futures contract matures and can be settled by delivery, but to
increase limits for the single month and the all-months-combined levels.'82 Additionally, the Commission chose to restrict both futures and
options at the same positions and exempt spread positions for the same
crop-year at limits determined by the Commission.'83 In light of the
concerns raised during the comment period,' the Commission opted

179. 58 Fed. Reg. 17495, supra note 160, at 17,498.
180. See ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 13, at 154 (defining speculative position
limits as: "the maximum position, either net long or net short, in one commodity
future (or option) or in all futures (or options) of one commodity combined, which
may be held or controlled by one person as prescribed by an exchange and/or by the
CFTC"); LEUTHOLD ET AL., supra note 10, at 376 (stating that contract limits are
placed only on transactions contracted by speculators and not by hedgers); Sanford J.
Grossman, The Case for Eliminating Position Limits on Financial Futures, in REGULATORY REVIEW AND REFORM OF THE FUTURES INDUSTRY 35 (Robert J. Mackay &
Robert W. Kamphuis, Jr. eds., 1992) (explaining that position limits function as a barrier preventing one party from cornering the market).
181. See Revision of Federal Speculative Position Limits, 52 Fed. Reg. 38.914
(1987) (indicating that federal speculative limits were last revised on Oct. 20, 1987).
182. Revision of Federal Speculative Position Limits, 58 Fed. Reg. 17,973 (1993)
[hereinafter 58 Fed. Reg. 17973]. See CFTC NEWS FEATURE, supra note 161, at 4
(stating that the Commission has approved interim final rules amending federal
speculative position limits on corn, wheat, soybeans, soybean oil, soybean meal, oats,
and cotton).
183. 58 Fed. Reg. 17973, supra note 182, at 17,973.
184. See 58 Fed. Reg. 17973, supra note 182, at 17,976 (indicating that an association of grain and oilseed merchandisers and processors raised concerns over the
newly proposed limit increase by suggesting that increases can have detrimental effects on commodities traded on a low volume base, such as oats and soymeal, and
can even decrease the level of price discovery, a practice required for maximum
productivity). Agricultural producers expressed opposition to increasing speculative
position limits arguing that an increase will create unwanted volatility in the market.
Id. Others stressed the need to conduct further studies and gather more conclusive
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for an incremental approach to amending speculative position limits,
scheduling a two-step process gradually leading up to the proposed final

position."

Options traders, associations of managed futures industry, farm organizations, and agricultural processors supported the unification of futures
and options limits, arguing that the benefits gained from the new limits
outweighed any inconveniences.' 86 They agreed that the proposal will
add liquidity and minimize the presence of net risk in the futures and

options markets." Also, the new mobility between the futures and options markets will create a variety of innovative hedging opportunities,' as well as futures and options contracts.8 9 While some commodity pool operators opposed the proposal, others encouraged the standardization of limits since fluctuations in price within the futures and

options markets are intertwined. 90 First, to facilitate the proposal's im-

plementation, the Commission decided that the CFTC shall: discard
temporarily rule 150.3(a)(2), which exempts options contracts that offset
data proving that increases are beneficial to the industry and will minimally affect
price volatility. Id.
185. 58 Fed. Reg. 17973, supra note 182, at 17,978-79. The first phase combines
futures and options limits to allow speculators greater flexibility. Id. at 17,978. In
March 1994, the Commission shall set the speculative position limit to one-half the
proposed final level. Id. About a year later, on April 30, 1995, the Commission will
raise the limits to the final proposed level. Id. The phase-in process enables the Commission to alter its actions according to market needs. Id.
186. 58 Fed. Reg. 17973, supra note 182, at 17,977. While market participants expressed concern that the unification of options and futures speculative position limits
would grant the Commission increased administrative powers, the Commission ensured
that this amendment would not endow more regulatory power than before. Id. at
17979 n.8. To guarantee this promise, the Commission did not modify rules governing
the reporting of options. Id. at 17,979. Moreover, in the spirit of the amendment, the
Commission sought to simplify compliance procedures for futures and options transactions. Id.
187. 58 Fed. Reg. 17973, supra note 179, at 17,977. The unification will eliminate
the need to manipulate opposite positions continually and thereby provide greater
power to the delta-neutral trader. Id. The flexibility eliminates restraints previously
placed on traders. Revision of Federal Speculative Position Limits. 57 Fed. Reg.
12,769 (1992) [hereinafter 57 Fed. Reg. 12766.
188. See ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 13, at 144 (defining hedging as: "taking a
position in a futures market opposite to a position held in the cash market to minimize the risk of financial loss from an adverse price change").
189. 58 Fed. Reg. 17973, supra note 182, at 17,977.
190. 58 Fed. Reg. 17973, supra note 182, at 17,977. The certainty obtained
through unity creates easier understanding of, and facilitates administrative activity
toward, market surveillance. 57 Fed. Reg. 12766, supra note 187, at 12,769.
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futures positions from federal speculative position limits; amend rule
150.2 to incorporate options positions on a futures-equivalent basis within the applicable speculative position levels; and change rule 150.1 to
include definitions of "futures equivalent,"'' 1 "long" position and
"short" position. 92
Second, the Commission decided to approve setting different speculative position limit levels in reaction to discouraging statistics.'93 The
Commission chose to select limits according to the size of the percentage of open interest or the distribution amount of the trader' 94 thereby
creating limits more indicative of market situations while remaining
within the bounds of rule 1.61.195 Commodity pool operators and trading advisors justified the change, indicating that the current limits restrained the futures and options markets from further growth.'96 Cotton
trade merchants explained that an increase in limits directly can improve
and revitalize market efficiency by increasing hedging opportunities."'

191. See 58 Fed. Reg. 17973, supra note 182, at 17,979 (explaining that
futures-equivalent is defined as "an option contract which has been adjusted by the
previous day's risk factor, or delta coefficient for that option").
192. 58 Fed. Reg. 17973. supra note 182, at 17,979.
193. 57 Fed. Reg. 12766, supra note 187, at 12,770. The Commission recognized
that the speculative position limits imposed in 1987 were ineffective since two factors
used to calculate limits, distribution of open traders and percentage of open interest,
have moved away from each other rather than converged. Id.
194. 58 Fed. Reg. 17973. supra note 182, at 17,979. The Kansas Cotton Board of
Trade (KCBT) and Minneapolis Grain Exchange (MGE) wheat and oats need not
adjust their speculative position limits to parallel those of the CBT. Id. Previously,
600 contracts were the limit for the spot month and the individual month contracts
devised in the KCBT, MGE and the CBT. Id. at 17,979 n.l1 Also, KCBT and CBT
faced a limit of 1,800 contracts and MGE spring wheat faced a limit of 1,200 contracts for the all-months contracts. Id. at 17,979. The differing levels of open interest
among the three contract markets and the ability to determine limits using current
deliverable supplies and trends indicated by spot month expirations justified this decision. Id. The Commission further explained that contracts based on the same commodity are traded normally one at a time and rarely simultaneously. Id. Furthermore,
the MGE reiterated that smaller exchanges successfully matched higher position limits
set for the CBT on previous occasions. Id.
195. See 17 C.F.R. §1.61 (1992) (asserting that rule 1.61 governs the exchanges'
procedure in setting speculative position limits).
196. 58 Fed. Reg. 17973. supra note 182, at 17,979.
197. See 58 Fed. Reg. 17973, supra note 182, at 17,976 (suggesting that since the
cotton trade survives on hedging capabilities, market liquidity created by any increase
in the speculative base would best promote successful hedging). One commentator
added that the changing environment of the commodity futures industry, where
self-investors can become a member of commodity pools, justified increased limits. Id.
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Most importantly, the current limits disadvantaged these markets in

competing with regulated and non-regulated foreign markets which lack
such limits.'98

Currently, proposals seeking to amend speculative position limits in
specific exchange-traded commodities await approval.' The Chicago
Mercantile Exchange (CME) submitted a proposal to amend its speculative position limits on live cattle, feeder cattle, live hogs futures and
options contracts, and the frozen pork bellies options contract." Upon
the implementation of the amendment, a speculative trader can "hold" a

maximum position "in any contract month of 2,400 live cattle contracts
until the close of business on the first business day following the first
Friday of the expiring contract month, and 750 feeder cattle contracts in
any contract month until the last ten days of trading of an expiring

contract month. 20' Also, the amendments enable traders to create an
unlimited number of options contracts on the same side of the market

for a single contract month in live cattle, feeder cattle, live hogs, and

These increased limits would assist in retaining the important role of speculators in
the marketplace. Id.
198. See 58 Fed. Reg. 17973, supra note 182, at 17,976 (noting that the commentators recognized that foreign markets without speculative position limits have not
faced similar problems), Grossman, supra note 180, at 79 app. (stating that the United
Kingdom, Japan, Australia, and Italy have no position limits and that burdensome
position limits have weakened the U.S. futures market relative to foreign competitors);
DEFERENTIAL TREATMENT OF CUSTOMERS, COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMIS-

(1993) (stating that the United Kingdom
does not have speculative position limits).
199. See, e.g., Chicago Merchantile Exchange: Proposed Amendments Relating to
Speculative Position Limits for the Live Cattle, Feeder Cattle, and Live Hogs Futures
and Option Contracts, and the Frozen Pork Bellies Option Contracts, 58 Fed. Reg.
19,236 (1993) [hereinafter 58 Fed. Reg. 19236]; Chicago Mercantile Exchange: Proposed Amendments Relating to Speculative Position Limits for the Standard & Poor's
500 Stock Price Index Futures and Option Contracts, 58 Fed. Reg. 19.090 (1993)
SION, DIVISION OF TRADING AND MARKETS

[hereinafter 58 Fed. Reg. 19090].

200. 58 Fed. Reg. 19236. supra note 195, at 19,236. The CME proposes to: (1)
withdraw the all-months-combined speculative position limits in live cattle, feeder
cattle, and live hogs futures and options contracts; (2) eliminate the 1,200 and 600
contract speculative position limits in the live cattle and feeder cattle contracts, which
are applicable to positions during the period immediately preceding the effective date
for the final spot month speculative position limit; (3) eliminate the nominal limit on
the actual number of option contracts that can be held on the same side of the market in any contract month in the live cattle, feeder cattle, live hogs, and frozen pork
bellies option contracts. Id.
201. 58 Fed. Reg. 19236, supra note 199, at 19,236.
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frozen pork bellies.2 2
The CME suggests that the elimination of the all-months combined
speculative limits not only provides the preferred position for commodities that are non-storable, but also adds greater volume and liquidity
with which hedgers may participate in the market.2 3 The ability for
traders to "hold on" to maximum speculative limits for a longer period
of time will allow greater flexibility for lifting or rolling positions to
attract large speculators.' 4 Lastly, by abolishing the maximum limits
on options contracts held by speculators on the same side of the market,
the net futures-equivalent position will govern option speculative position
limits and thereby encourage the participation of agricultural producers
and other hedgers seeking price protection.2 5
The CME also proposed to amend its speculative position limits for
the Standard & Poor's 500 Stock Price Index (S&P 500) futures and
options contracts.2" The CME plans to increase the number of futures
and options contracts from 5,000 to 10,000 contracts for the
all-months-combined speculative position limits.20 7 Member firms and
their customers promoted this amendment, arguing that the rise in investor interest in the S&P 500 futures and option contracts over the last
few years mandate such a change.20 '
C.

EXEMPTION STATUS FOR FOREIGN FUTURES AND OPTIONS
TRANSACTIONS

To keep pace with the rapid development of the international futures
markets, the CFTC amended rule 30 governing foreign futures and options transactions under the agency's customer protections regulatory
scheme.2" Rule 30.10, regulating petitions for exemptions, best illus-

202. See 58 Fed. Reg. 19236, supra note 199, at 19,236 (calculating that presently
a trader is restricted to a limit of 7,500 option contracts in live cattle, 3,600 option
contracts in feeder cattle and live hogs, and 2,400 option contracts in frozen pork
bellies).
203. 58 Fed. Reg. 19236, supra note 199, at 19,236.
204. 58 Fed. Reg. 19236, supra note 199, at 19,237.
205. 58 Fed. Reg. 19236, supra note 199, at 19,237.
206. 58 Fed. Reg. 19090. supra note 199, at 19,090.
207. 58 Fed. Reg. 19090, supra note 199, at 19,090. Presently, the CME Rules
forbid a trader to hold futures and option contracts in S&P 500 or a combination of
futures and futures-equivalent option contracts net on the same side of the market in
all contract months That exceed 5,000 contracts. Id.
208. 58 Fed. Reg. 19090, supra note 199, at 19,090.
209. See Foreign Futures and Foreign Options Transactions, 52 Fed. Reg. 28,980
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trates the deregulatory trend of the Commission.2"0 Under rule 30.10,
foreign participants shall apply with particularity, clearly stating the
reasons for exemption, and also agree to observe U.S. rules through a
designated agent pursuant to the provisions of rule 30.5.2 Additional-

ly, before the Commission can grant exemption status, it must find that
agency exercises comparable standards to U.S. customthe applicant
2
ers.

21

Before -publishing its final rule order, the CFTC received many comments from market participants and regulators.2 3 In particular, U.S.
exchanges argued that great difficulty would arise in determining the
definition of comparability and the equivalent level of enforcement. 2 4
Additionally, they expressed concerns over granting privileges to foreign

nations who do not operate reciprocal policies with U.S. firms. 215 On
the other hand, foreign exchanges overwhelmingly supported exemption

(1987) [hereinafter 52 Fed. Reg. 28980] (stating that the Commission imposed rule 30
to satisfy Congressional goals to subject foreign futures and options to comparable
regulatory standards and that it hopes the rule will serve as the first step toward a
harmonization of regulatory activity among international markets); Wilmouth, supra
note 3, at 192 (stating that foreign firms with comparable regulatory requirements
receive exemption from host states).
210. 17 C.F.R. § 30.10 (1992). Under the Commodity Exchange Act, rule 30.10
allows persons located outside the United States and who face comparable regulatory
standards from their home states to request rule 30.10 exemption status. Id. Other sections that fall under rule 30 include: (1) definitions; (2) applicability of the act and
rules; (3) prohibited transactions; (4) registration; (5) alternative procedures for
non-domestic. persons; (6) disclosure; (7) treatment of foreign futures and options
secured amount; (8) quarterly reporting requirements; (9) fraudulent transactions that
are prohibited; and (10) applicability of state law. 17 C.F.R. § 30 (1992).
211. See 52 Fed. Reg. 28980, supra note 209, at 28,981 (stating that they must
also present and maintain record books for inspection by the CFTC or a representative of the United States Department of Justice).
2707 (stating that it is the duty of
212. See Commodity Exchange Act (CCH)
the person seeking exemption to include with particularity the proof of comparability
and all explanations).
213. See 52 Fed. Reg. 28980, supra note 209, at 28,981 (noting that the Commission received thirty comments from U.S. contract markets, FCMs, the Futures Industry
Association (FIA), National Futures Association (NFA), the Departments of Commerce
and Justice, the North American Securities Administrators Association, Inc. (NASAA),
foreign exchanges, foreign commodities firms, and governmental entities).
214. 58 Fed. Reg. 28980, supra note 209, at 28,993.
215. See 58 Fed. Reg. 28980, supra note 209, at 28,993 (noting that one exchange proposed that when a foreign firm applies for exemption status, the application
should be published in the Federal Register so that concerned parties may comment
on it). The Commission has rejected such an unprecedented procedure. Id.
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relief and suggested that the CFTC allow governmental agencies or
self-regulatory organizations to file petitions on behalf of their member
firms to reduce duplication." 6 Based on these comments, the Commission set up seven requirements that every foreign applicant must meet to
receive an exemption: qualification, minimum financial requirements,
customer funds, recordkeeping and reporting, sales practice standards,
compliance, and information sharing." 7
Recently, the CFTC expanded the powers allotted to firms with exemption status under rule 30.10.18 The order, issued on November 3,
1992, allows firms with rule 30.10 relief2 .9 to transact directly in limit-

2707.
216. Commodity Exchange Act (CCH)
217. Id. See Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Action Order for 17 C.F.R.
Part 30, 9-10 (1993) (stating that qualification will be assessed according to fitness
standards required for registration, authorization, and licensing). To satisfy the minimum financial requirements element, there must be standards that protect a firm's
holding of customer accounts when one customer defaults on the customer's payments
and that ensure a licensee's possession of sufficient funds. Id. To protect customer
funds from misapplication, customer funds must be segregated from firms' funds. Id.
The segregation protects customers from bankruptcy and fraud. Id. Records including
trade confirmations, customers' segregation records, accounting records for customer
and proprietary trades and discretionary account documentation, monthly customer
account statements, and order tickets shall be made available for inspection. Id. Minimum sales practice standards protecting customers from fraud and misrepresentation
including unapproved advertising, improper trading activities, disclosures to prospective
customers, and prohibitions on certain representation must be in force. Id. A system
to ensure compliance with the rules and to redress violations must be found. Id.
Finally, an effective information-sharing arrangement between the Commission and the
appropriate organization must be found. Id. See generally Commodity Exchange Act
2707 (explaining that each agency must meet certain minimum standards
(CCH)
before the CFTC can grant exemption status).
218. Limited Marketing Activities From a United States Location by Certain Firms
and Their Employees or Other Representatives Exempted Under Commodity Futures
Trading Commission Rule 30.10, 57 Fed. Reg. 49,644 (1992) [hereinafter 57 Fed.
Reg. 49644].
219. See Foreign Investment Approvals- & Exemptions, 1-91 BACKGROUNDER (1993)
[hereinafter Foreign Investment Approvals] (indicating the exchanges receiving rule
30.10 relief). The exchanges to which rule 30.10 relief applies include: the SIB, the
Securities and Futures Authority (SFA), the IMRO, the Commission des Operations de
Bourse (COB), Members of the Marche a Terme International de France (MATIF),
the Toronto Futures Exchange and its designated members, the Montreal Exchange,
the Singapore International Monetary Exchange (SIMEX), the Sydney Futures Exchange, and the Tokyo Grain Exchange. Id. The Kuala Lumpur Commodity Exchange,
Mercados de Financieros de Futures, and the New Zealand Futures and Options Exchange currently await relief. Id.
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ed foreign futures or options contracts in the United States tlhrough their
employees or subsidiaries." A series of amendments predated this
change: the CFTC broadened and liberalized the scope of rule 30.10 by
enabling foreign firms to correspond directly with U.S. persons from
within the United States; ' representatives of foreign firms exempted
under rule 30.10 can now solicit certain U.S. institutional entities under
specific circumstances and conditions;22 and the CFTC approved the
participation of foreign futures exchanges in limited one-day promotional
events in the United States.m
Only a "qualified eligible participant" (QEP)224 shall benefit from
the new expansion. This limitation ensures that customer protection remains the Commission's primary goal while expanding rule 30.10 activity to attract foreign participants.' The amendment, moreover, does

220. 57 Fed. Reg. 49644, supra note 218, at 49,644.
221. 57 Fed. Reg. 49644, supra note 218, at 49,645. See Division of Trading and
24,085, Jan. 15,
Markets Interpretative Letter 88-3, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)
1988 (stating that foreign firms are still eligible for rule 30.10 relief even if they interact with affiliated or unaffiliated United States registered international brokers

(i1s)).
222. See Division of Trading and Markets Interpretative Letter 90-14. 2 Comm.
24,688 (July 24, 1990) (stating that this expansion, nevertheFut. L. Rep. (CCH)
less, required the registered person, belonging to affiliates of Commission-registered
firms, to accompany the foreign firms and compelled Commission-registered firms to
open the foreign firm's accounts).
223. 57 Fed. Reg. 49644, supra note 218, at 49,646. The CFTC staff argued that
this provision benefited U.S. customers by providing exchanges with a better opportunity to promote and advertise their products to certain United States institutional customers. Id.
224. See Exemption for Commodity Pool Operators with Respect to Offerings to
Qualified Eligible Participants; Exemption for Commodity Trading Advisors with Respect to Qualified Eligible Clients, 57 Fed. Reg. 34,853, 34,860 (1992) (defining
"qualified eligible participants" as enumerated in rule 4.7(a)(ii) as: "one who may participate in an exempt pool" and explaining that the Commission intended to define
QEP [Qualified Eligible Participants] through objective criteria requiring that "such
persons possess either the investment expertise and experience necessary to understand
the risks involved, as evidenced by the registered status of certain investment professionals, or have an investment portfolio of a size sufficient to indicate that the participant has substantial investment experience and thus a high degree of sophistication
with regard to investments as well as financial resources to withstand the risk of their
investment").
225. See 57 Fed. Reg. 49644, supra note 218, at 49646 (stating that the Commission chose to utilize the "QEP" definition because it demanded a portfolio test which
focuses on a person's investment experience). The Commission, however, remained
flexible in expanding the list of participants, subject to the results of the initial
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not allow foreign firms to provide services from permanent locations in
the United States. 226 If foreign firms have permanent status, they become subject to the rules and regulations of the CFTC and must register
with the Commission.r
V. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND AGREEMENTS
Regulatory agencies have participated in international organizations
designed to enhance cooperation among nations and to create new linkages among markets.2 s In addition, they have developed improved
methods for communication and information sharing through bilateral
agreements. 229 Two primary vehicles fostering cooperation and
encouraging harmonization within the commodities market include the
International Organization of Securities Commission (IOSCO) and an
international treaty making device called the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU).
A.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF SECURITIES COMMISSION

IOSCO was officially created in 1984 to instigate the cooperation and
coordination necessary for a harmonization of international securities and
futures regulations.23 Over 50 countries23 participate in IOSCO; in
amendment. Id.
226. 57 Fed. Reg. 49644, supra .note 218. at 49,646. The CFTC decided that a
firm is entitled relief under this order if it solicits activity for less than a total of
thirty days in duration or frequency. Id.
227. 57 Fed. Reg. 49644, supra note 218, at 49,646. See Commodity Exchange

Act (CCH) I 2705A (stating that the Commission requires those foreign businesses
which establish a fixed presence in the United States, de facto presence, to register).
228. See Executive Summary, supra note 152, at 23-28 (noting that the United
States and other nations pursue information sharing arrangements and other cooperative
measures through working parties established by IOSCO and bilateral agreements
created by participating nations).
229. See infra notes 264-76 and accompanying text (discussing MOUs as a
potential mechanism through which to enhance cooperation between commodity
exchanges).
230. See Paul Guy, Regulatory Harmonization to Achieve Effective International
Competition, in REGULATING INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETS: ISSUES AND PO-

291 (Franklin R. Edwards & Hugh T. Patrick eds., 1992) (explaining that in
1984 IOSCO succeeded the Interamerican Association of Securities Commission and
Similar Agencies, founded in 1974, to address developments within the securities markets in Latin America).
231. See News in Brief, INT'L SEC. REG. REP., Nov. 2, 1993 [hereinafter News in
LICIES
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turn, these countries organize into an Executive Committee,232 regional
These
standing committees," and specialized working com'mittees.
committees attempt to address issues promoting harmonization by encouraging the adoption of comparable regulation that can prevent the
placement of limitations or impediments on foreign competitors. 5 In
addition, they seek to create an open market environment that will preserve competitive equalityY 6
Two types of barriers, politicalf 7 and regulatory,"8 prevent competitive equality from becoming a reality. As IOSCO exerts pressure on
Brier] (indicating that the IOSCO's 18th annual meeting held in Mexico City revealed
that there are now 110 members).
232. Guy, supra note 230. at 292. Members of the Executive Committee consist
of the following organizations: the National Cor~panies and Securities Commission of
Australia, the Commission des operations de bourse of France, the Commissione
Nazionale per le Societa e la Borsa of Italy, the Securities Bureau of the Ministry of
Finance of Japan, the Comision Nacional de Valores of Mexico, the Ontario Securities
Commission, the Securities and Investments Board of the United Kingdom, and the
Securities and Exchange Commission of the United States. Id.
233. Guy, supra note 230, at 292. The regional standing committees include: the
Interamerican Regional Committee. the European Regional Committee, and the
Asia-Pacific Regional Committee. Id.
234. Guy, supra note 230, at 292. Two specialized working committees include
the Technical Committee on International Transactions, which consists of agencies that
regulate the most developed markets and raise regulatory problems arising from
cross-border investment activity, and the Development Committee, which consists of
regulators of emerging markets that encourage the growth of new markets and confront problems acting as barriers. Id. at 293. Two Consultative Committees have been
created to provide channels for affiliate members of IOSCO, to voice their concerns.
Id. See also News in Brief, supra note 231 (indicating that Kenya and Nigeria created
some controversy when they requested membership into the Technical Committee
despite their developing nation status). The committee elected to grant membership on
an ad hoc basis and under the discretion of its members. Id.
235. See Nancy Worth, Harmonizing Capital Adequacy Rules for International
Banks and Securities Firms, 18 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COMM. REG. 134, 145 (1992)

(stating that IOSCO coordinates regulation in the hopes of creating a common playing
ground).
236. See Guy, supra note 230, at 293 (suggesting that the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development defines "open market" as securities-related services with full access to the market and freedom to function in any subsector of the
securities sector, either established in the country of origin or on a cross-border basis).
237. Guy, supra note 230, at 294. A government intentionally implements political
barriers to hinder the access of foreign investors into its markets. Id.
238. Guy, supra note 230, at 294. Regulatory barriers are those where agencies'
supervise the entry of foreign participants or impose strict reciprocity requirements. Id.
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market participants, however, it can overcome most political barriers.

9

Also, IOSCO can impact the financial services industry directly through
working parties established by the Technical Committee on International

Transactions.24 In the past, several effective working parties attempted
to assess the level of progress and to provide guidelines for futures
practices.2 4 The publication of the results of the working parties, presented at the Venice Conference in 1989, symbolized the beginning of a
movement toward regulatory harmony.4 2 Because IOSCO's recommendations are not compulsory,243 however, the international financial
community must implement these proposals and support IOSCO if the
community desires to establish competitive equality."l
IOSCO works closely with other organizations. The Group of Thirty,245 the International Federation of Stock Exchanges, and the European Economic Community have influenced IOSCO concerning issues of
clearing and settlement.24 6 The International Accounting Standards

239. Guy, supra note 230, at 294.
240. Guy, supra note 230, at 294. This committee met for the first time in July
1987 in London to discuss problems encountered by regulators while carrying out
international transactions. Id.
241. See Guy, supra note 230, at 295 (stating that the working parties have addressed problems concerning equity offerings on an international basis, including
'euro-equity offerings'). In addition, they reviewed the problems of multiple listings,
auditing and accounting approved by International Accounting Standards Committee
(IASC) and the International Federation of Accountants; capital requirements for multinational securities firms; exchange of financial informatiofi; growth of international
off-market trading; international clearing and settlements; coordination among futures
regulators; methods to distinguish futures markets and futures intermediaries; ethics for
financial intermediaries; and rules of conduct for intermediaries in an international
setting. Id.
242. Guy, supra note 230, at-295. The two most critical issues concerned international equity offers and capital adequacy standards. Id.
243. See Guy, supra note 230, at 296 (emphasizing that IOSCO provides only a
forum for market regulators to discuss issues). The Annual Conferences provide a
forum for consultation and the Consultative Committees provide a forum for direct
interaction by SROs. Id.
244. Guy, supra note 230, at 295.
245. See COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION, INTERMARKET COORDINATION REPORT 37 (1991)[hereinafter INTERMARKET COORDINATION REPORT] (explaining

that the Group of Thirty is an organization that promotes activity in the international
financial system).
246. Guy, supra note 230, at 259. In the field of clearing and settlement, IOSCO
seeks to reevaluate the structure of clearing and settlement systems by examining the
influence the derivative markets has in the system and by incorporating issues such as
systemic vulnerability, risk elimination, and risk management, concerns that are shared
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Committee (IASC) worked with IOSCO to review accounting and auditing standards; this joint effort led to the publication of Exposure Draft
32 on Comparability of Financial Statements.247
In 1991, eight jurisdictions joined to form the IOSCO Working Party
on Futures, led by the CFTC.S Some accomplishments of the group
include a cross-regulatory comparison of the existing regulatory systems
for derivatives, a report listing ten Principles governing screen-based
trading,249 and a summary of the types of information sharing that

maintains levels of confidentiality among participating jurisdictionsY
The CFTC also participated in the Clearance and Settlement Working
Party and the Working Party on Principles of Conduct of Business."

The Working Party on Clearance and Settlement recommended that
international markets utilize a worldwide comparable standard for clearance, settlement, and payment systems. 2 The Working Party on Prin-

ciples of Conduct of Business created a report listing seven principles of
business conduct which IOSCO adopted at its annual meeting in November of 1990."3
The CFTC actively participated in the IOSCO Enforcement and Exchange of Information Working Party.' The group produced a report
listing ten principles governing the negotiation and implementation of

Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) approved by IOSCO in September 1991." Having completed the project on MOUs, the same group

by regulatory agencies. Id. IOSCO intends to harmonize regulatory standards by establishing a set of minimum standards and to encourage cross-border transactions through
direct linkages. Id.
247. Id. IASC produced a report, approved for implementation in June 1991, suggesting methods to limit the number of international options contracts. Id.
248. See INTERMARKET COORDINATION REPORT, supra note 245, at 22 (noting that
the participants were Australia, France, Italy, Japan, Switzerland, the United States
(SEC and CFTC), the United Kingdom, and West Germany). Sweden, Hong Kong,
and the Canadian provinces of Ontario and Quebec contributed. Id.
249. Id. The ten Principles created an international consensus in dealing with automated trading systems. Id.
250. INTERMARKET COORDINATION REPORT, supra note 245, at 22.
251. INTERMARKET COORDINATION REPORT, supra note 245, at 22.
252. INTERMARKET COORDINATION REPORT, supra note 245, at 23. With the assistance of the Group of Thirty, the Working Party on Clearance and Settlement produced six recommendations about improving the national clearing and settlement systems and methods to improve cross-border lines between those systems. Id.
253. INTERMARKET COORDINATION REPORT, supra note 245, at 23.
254. INTERMARKET COORDINATION REPORT, supra note 245, at 22.
255. Executive Summary, supra note 151, at 27. The principles outlined a blueprint
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confronted issues concerning money laundering, cross-boiler room operations, and enforcement of screen-based trading systems. 6 The CFTC
currently is participating in the Working Party on Regulation of Market
Professionals." 7 This group works to develop a common position on
the supervision of financial conglomerates."
The Working Party on Secondary Markets replaces the Working Party
on Futures, which completed its mandate5 9 This revised group seeks
to address concerns such as the coordination between cash and derivative markets, proprietary screen-based trading, design of index derivative
products, and transparency. 2" Although the regulators of the derivatives
markets dissolved the Working Party on Futures, many members of that
Group decided to maintain and update the "Collated Summary of Responses to Common Framework of Analysis and Cross-Regulatory
Chart," a report which is designed to illustrate the regulatory systems of
the participating members."' The CFTC, which compiled the report,
will continue to update the document independently of IOSCO.262 This
document is now entitled "International Regulation of Derivative Markets, Products and Financial Intermediaries" and includes the original ten
jurisdictions plus two new participants as of December 31, 1992.263
B.

MEMORANDA OF UNDERSTANDING

Information sharing arrangements have become critical -in today's

for developing MOUs. Id.
256. Executive Summary, supra note 151, at 27.
257. Executive Summary, supra note 151, at 27.
258. Executive Summary, supra note 151, at 27-28.
259. Executive Summary, supra note 151, at 26.
260. Executive Summary, supra note 151, at 27.
261. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION,
SPONSE TO

COMMON

FRAMEWORK

OF ANALYSIS

COLLATED SUMMARY OF RECROSS-REGULATORY CHART

AND

(1990). IOSCO approved this document at its annual meeting in Santiago, Chile,
November 1990. Executive Summary, supra note 151, at 28.
262.

COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION. ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS

28 (1992).
263. See

COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION.

INTERNATIONAL

REGULA-

331-45
(1993) (listing that the jurisdictions are Australia, the Canadian provinces of Ontario
and Quebec, France, Hong Kong, the Japanese Ministry of Finance, Sweden, the
United Kingdom, and the CFTC and SEC in the United States). Two new participants
are Italy and Spain. Id. The effect of this document encourages other regulatory agencies to participate in order to document all approaches to regulation of derivatives
markets. Id.
TION OF DERIVATIVE MARKETS,

PRODUCTS AND FINANCIAL

INTERMEDIARIES
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global futures and options market.'

4

MOUs, defined as bilateral agree-

ments between market authorities, provide a means for effective
cross-border information sharing toward the enforcement of products,

participants, and the use of information technology. 65 Currently, the
CFTC has entered into regulatory and enforcement MOUs with Australia, Brazil, Canada, France, Singapore, Taiwan, and the United King2
dom.
The United States and the United Kingdom entered into a Memorandum of Understanding on Mutual Assistance and Exchange of Information Between the CFTC, SEC, the U.K. Department of Trade and Industry, and the Securities and Investments Board on September 1991.267
This MOU broadened the reach of the agencies' powers in enforcement

matters.268 For example, the MOU sought to improve the regulation of
fraudulent and abusive acts and to provide for accelerated methods to
counter those acts.269 Motivated by the spirit of this MOU, the CFTC
has developed unofficial relationships with other nations to exchange
264. See INTERMARKET COORDINATION REPORT, supra note 248, at 19 (indicating
the critical nature of information sharing arrangements to improve the competitiveness
of the markets and to cope with the increase in international participants and crossborder trading).
265. The CFTC: An Active Partner in International Cooperation Through Enforcement and Regulatory Memoranda of Understanding, 4-92 BACKGROUNDER 1 (1992)
[hereinafter Active Partner]; see Michael P. Malloy, Bumper Cars: Themes of Convergence in International Regulation, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. SI, S10 (1992) (stating that
bilateral agreements like MOUs can serve as the first step to a broader coordinated
response).
266. Id. at 1. Specifically, the CFTC abides by an enforcement MOU with Brazil,
France and the United Kingdom. Id. at 2. The MOU between France and thu United
States concerns issues such as misrepresentation, fraudulent or manipulative practices,
and the failure by market professionals to behave honestly. Id. The MOU between
Brazil and the United States deals with providing access to confidential information
including the ability to take the testimony of witnesses. See also CFTC NEWS FEATURE, supra note 161, at 10 (stating that the Taiwan authorities entered into a MOU
with the United States on January 11, 1993).
'267. Active Partner, supra note 265, at 2. This MOU supersedes the MOU signed
earlier in 1986. id.
268. Active Partner, supra note 257, at 2. Situations that fall under this MOU
include fraud in the sale of: option contracts and foreign futures to U.S. customers;
prohibited off-exchange option and futures contracts to U.S. customers; violations of
trade practice on U.S. markets including wash sales, cross trading, and accommodation
trading; material omission or fraudulent statements in reports or applications filed with
the CFTC; and infractions of reporting requirements under the Commodity Exchange
Act and relevant regulations. Id.
269. Active Partner,supra note 265.

642

AM. U. J. INT'LL. & POL'Y

[VOL. 9:2

information and cooperative measures concerning enforcement matters.270
Regulatory MOUs also help preserve the integrity of the markets and
" ' The United Kingdom and the United States signed
their participants.27
the Financial Information Sharing Memorandum of Understanding
(FISMOU) on September 1, 1988.272 Under the FISMOU, participating
agencies can ask for routine or ad hoc information sharing requests
satisfying traditional financial requirements for U.S. firms with branches
in the United Kingdom. 3 In exchange, an Addendum, added on May
15, 1989, reciprocated this waiver to British firms which received exemption status from the CFTC under rule 30.10.274 The CFTC also entered into a FISMOU with Canada in 1991.275 Furthermore, the United
States entered into a Mutual Recognition Memorandum of Understanding
(MRMOU) with the French Commission des Operations de Bourse
(COB) in December of 1991.276

270. See Executive Summary, supra note 152, at 24 (stating that currently, there
are unofficial reciprocal agreements with Australia, Canada, Germany, Hong Kong,
Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, and Switzerland).
271. Active Partner,supra note 265. at 1.
272. Active Partner,supra note 265, at 4. This was the first Financial Information
Sharing Memorandum of Undestanding (FISMOU) signed between any two nations. Id.
The participants included U.S. and U.K. regulatory and self-regulatory organizations.
Id.
273. Active Partner,supra note 265.
274. Active Partner,supra note 265, at 4-5.
275. Active Partner, supra note 265, at 5. The participants of the Canadian
FISMOU (the CFTC, the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC), the Commission des
valeurs mobilieres du Quebec (CVMQ), the Toronto Futures Exchange, and the Montreal Exchange) agreed to share information about the Quebec and Ontario firms that
were exempt from registration under CFTC rule 30.10 and key related firms in Canada and the United States. Executive Summary, supra note 152, at 24, 25.
276. Active Partner, supra note 265, at 4. This MRMOU enables U.S. firms to
conduct business directly with French customers and vice versa. Id. As a result, licensed brokers can engage in cross-jurisdictional transactions, conditioned upon recognition by the COB or the CFTC. Id. Similar MRMOUs exist between the United
States and the Ontario Securities Commission, the Montreal Exchange, the Commission des valeurs mobilieres du Quebec, the Toronto Futures Exchange and the National Futures Association (NFA) to complement CFTC rule 30.10. See Executive Summary, supra note 152, at 24 (stating that information sharing is provided on an as needed basis).
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

This Comment has provided a general description of regulatory changes implemented by two of the largest markets, with specific reference to
significant statutes, regulations, -and other influential documents.277
These changes indicate that both the United States and the United Kingdom are entering a restructuring period of their regulatory systems" 8
for competitive purposes. 9 The changes depict a convergence of regulatory activity. As a result, the convergence reflects the optimal regulatory solution in which each nation reacts individually to market situations.
The respective agencies of the United States and the United Kingdom
have undergone changes in reaction to current market fluctuations and to
help remedy problems posed by the increasing internationalization of the
commodities industry.2" Due to an increase in cross-border activities,
international transactions dominate much of the industry's business today.2 ' Innovative electronic trading systems are replacing the traditional pit forums and further expanding the boundaries to previously unknown limits." 2

277. See supra notes 96-276 (describing how the CFTC implemented several revisions to its rules governing risk disclosure, speculative position limits, and foreign
nation exemption status, the United Kingdom proposed a revamping of its current regulatory system, and both the United States and the United Kingdom have joined
working parties and signed MOUs to promote harmonization).
278. See supra notes 10-95 and accompanying text (providing a framework of
commodities regulation in the United States and the United Kingdom from which both
countries have worked to eliminate burdensome requirements and unnecessary costs).
279. Large, supra note 4. See George J. Benston. Competition Versus Competitive
Equality in International FinancialMarkets in REGULATING INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
MARKETS: ISSUES AND POLICIES 277 (Franklin R. Edwards & Hugh T. Patrick eds.,
1992) (asserting that customers benefit from a competitive market that enables them
to acquire the goods and services they require and thereby contribute to a nation's
wealth). But cf Wilmouth, supra note 3, at 191-92 (stating that the differing regulatory requirements have created conflicting business procedures and that duplicative requirements have increased transaction costs).
280. See Economic Causes, supra note 3, at 361 (stating that advances in financial, telecommunications, and computational technology, political restructuring of its
markets, and capital market imbalances accelerated the rapid internationalization of the
market).
281. See Economic Causes, supra note 3. at 349 (explaining that the domestic
financial services market of the 1960s and 1970s experienced a steady decline while
international markets, developed in the 1980s, replaced their activity).
282. See Executive Summary, supra note 152, at 31-35 (stating that the acceptance
of further proposals to expand Globex, the automated systein instituted in the United
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Such progressive changes require institutional support for legitimizing
and facilitating the interaction of numerous active markets. As a result,
certain market participants and analysts suggest that a single
super-regulatory agency create and enforce a standard set of rules regulating all commodity futures and options transactions."' Although the
proposal for a single mega-institution appears at first glance to promote
efficiency and harmony, the proposal ignores key market characteristics. 28" First, a super-regulatory agency likely would overlook particular

idiosyncrasies of the commodities market.2"' In its desire to treat all
States by the CME and Reuters, have received approval); Wilmouth, supra note 3, at
191 (acknowledging that U.S. exchanges tend to emphasize creating electronic trading
systems to make them more competitive and to attract more international investors).
Screen trading appears to have replaced the role of open-outcry trading. Id. The Tokyo Stock Exchange, Swiss Options and Financial Futures Exchange, Osaka Securities
Exchange are fully automated. ld; Albrecht, supra note 24, at 6 (indicating that internationalization compelled IOSCO to adopt ten principles governing screen-based trading systems).
283. See Economic Causes, supra note 3, at 351, 370-71 (stating that some commentators believe that the plethora of markets with different regulatory procedures
mandate the creation of a single "uber-regulator" to supervise a standard worldwide
set of regulations).
284. See Economic Causes, supra note 3, at 372 (emphasizing that the diversity of
markets proves beneficial to the industry by allowing innovation and experimentation
and by enabling participants to choose transaction procedures that best suit a person's
market status and work best in conjunction with market changes).
285. Economic Causes, supra note 3, at 372. International quality competition
among regulators provides a market mechanism that helps prevent regulators from
adopting rules that impose costs in excess of their benefits. Id., see ALAN STONE,
REGULATION AND ITS ALTERNATIVE 245 (1982) (stating that regulation by one body
will disrupt the natural flow and functioning of market activity and will move away
from professionals who deal with the particularities and uniqueness of the market on
a daily basis); Edward J. Kane, Regulatory Structure in Futures Markets: Jurisdictional Competition between the SEC, the CFTC, and other Agencies, 4 J. FUTURES MARKETS 370 (1984) (stating that industry regulation stimulates the creation of performance measures that cushion fluctuations in market activity at minimum levels of cost
as well as seek *methods to maximize aggregate profits). When government bodies
intervene, they not only restrict profit levels directly but also influence participants to
minimize efforts in creating performance guarantees and production costs. Id.; see
Diamond & Kollar, supra note 10, at 98 (proposing that standard rules can overtax
certain members as they take action to protect their risk). See also Interview with
Division of Economic Analysis. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, in Washington, D.C. (July 27, 1993) (stating that because the needs of each commodities market
is unique and because the commodity futures market evolved from the specific needs
and requirements of the local cash market, those needs vary from nation to nation).
As a result, factors, such as specific grade specifications, transportation efficiencies,
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participants uniformly, the standard set of rules may not satisfy the
types of contracts required in specific markets and circumstances. 86
Also, a super-regulatory agency may prove dangerous to impose such a
permanent, all-powerful body during periods of market turmoil; the
ability to change in response to transient problems may be compromised.287 While such an institution might remedy current difficulties,
its long term effects could be catastrophic because it might eliminate the

ability to develop innovative contracts and to experiment freely. 88
The corporate and shipping industries provide examples of both
over-regulated and under-regulated markets. These industries highlight
the consequences of ignoring specific market trends and indicators within the framework of a long-term plan. The corporate and shipping indus-

tries illustrate the consequences and rewards of modifying regulation to
incorporate current market trends.8 9 First, in Delaware a more flexible
and liberal set of incorporation rules has allowed it to emerge as the

incorporation capital of the United States.2" Specific characteristics that
make Delaware the state of choice include the Delaware General Corpo-

local usage, and temporal conditions, serve as viable barriers for non-local futures
exchanges from entering into the local market. Id. Without outside involvement, contracts rely on local demand for hedging purposes which stimulates the volume of
contract exchanges and in turn increases price discovery (i.e., the process of determining the price level for a commodity based on supply and demand factors). Id. This
subtle process diminishes the hedging usefulness of non-local contracts. Id.
286. See, e.g., Benston, supra note 269, at 287 (stating that the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), an international body governing banking activities, may disadvantage certain members, including the United States and other foreign banks that
share similar tax structures with the United States). Consequently, the BIS fails to
place its members on a common playing ground. Id.
287. See Economic Causes, supra note 3, at 372 (stating that standardization will
impose regulations inconsistent with fluctuating worldwide standards).
288. See Economic Causes, supra note 3, at 351 (stating that the maintenance of
individual regulatory regimes allows for experimentation and innovation, in addition to
countering governmental attempts to impose excessive regulation).
289. See infra notes 298-301 and accompanying text (explaining that corporations
and the shipping industry provide examples of the benefits of self-regulation and the
consequences of excessive governmental regulation).
290. See Rodman Ward, Jr. & Erin Kelly, Why Delaware Leads in the United
States as a Corporate Domicile, 9 DEL. LAW. 15, 15 (1991) (stating that over 50%
of the largest U.S. corporations have chosen Delaware as their state of incorporation).
Moreover, over two-thirds of companies seeking reincorporation have moved to Delaware. Id. Furthermore, many international corporations set up subsidiaries in Delaware,
and two of the most prominent include Sony/Columbia Acquisition Corp. and
Yamanouchi Acquisition Corp. Id.
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ration Law's flexibility in instituting up-to-the-minute statute changes,29' the permanence and predictability of statutory interpretation, and
devotion to servicing its chartered members.292 Deleware's popularity is
a company can incorporate293 and
augmented by the speed with which
294
the ability to reduce agency costs.
Delaware's ability to tailor regulation to what best satisfies market

participants has enabled it to capture a substantial portion of the incorporation market.295 If Delaware were required to conform to a standard
set of rules governing incorporation, it might lose its appeal, and corporations might choose to incorporate elsewhere. Furthermore, there would
be little incentive for states like Delaware to create innovative and more
efficient rules. The Delaware example illustrates the benefits of allowing
each nation to establish rules governing its own exchange. If all nations
followed the same rules and one supreme body governed, the commodities market could stagnate and become saturated.296 Without incentives.
growth might slow down, and a booming industry could grind to a

halt.297

The shipping industry offers another example of the consequences
faced by a nation that imposes burdensome statutory rules on an industry. On June 30, 1993, SeaLand Services, Inc. and American President
Lines, announced their decision to relocate seven of their fifteen ships to

291. See Curtis Alva, Delaware and the Market for Corporate Charters: History
and Agency, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 885, 890 n.11 (1990) (stating that the Delaware
General Corporation Law is designed to incorporate quickly innovative changes enacted by other states that are favorable to the corporation and that can best satisfy the
interests of the shareholders).
292. Ward & Kelly, supra note 290, at 16.
293. Alva, supra note 291, at 901. For example, the process of service of all
papers to examine a company's level of fitness takes about three weeks in New
York, four weeks in Connecticut, but only 24 hours in Delaware. Id.
294. Alva, supra, note 291, at 919. Delaware's commitment to maintaining a small
corporate legal body allows for the relocation of a corporation's domiciliary to the
most cost-efficient agent, thereby reducing agency costs. Id.
295. See Alva, supra note 291, at 889-90 (stating that Delaware regularly seeks to
update its law concerning corporations in order to maintain its control of market
shares and to keep up with changing corporate practices).
296. See Kane, supra note 285, at 370 (indicating that growth depends on a system of self-regulation where there are incentives to improve performance guarantees).
These constant improvements function to maximize the aggregate profit of the commodities industry. Id.
297. See Kane, supra note 285, at 371 (explaining that when there is no room for
self-regulation, the market lacks the incentive to maximize performance guarantees,
and the governments can use their political needs to manipulate profit margins).
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foreign nations."9 Officials of the two companies have been negotiating with the United States Government for several years but have been
unable to come up with a satisfactory solution."' As a result, strict
safety rules and tax laws in the United States forced the two flagship
companies to find alternative countries to register their ships."l The
companies' action raised concerns because the moving of the ships to
foreign nations would endanger potentially 30,000 U.S. jobs and reduce
seriously the number of ships available to the military during times of
30 1

war.

These two examples clearly illustrate the need for markets and their
regulators to adapt to changing environments. By ignoring market trends,
a nation can suffer enormously.3 2 Specifically, a nation can lose significant revenue that an industry's presence produces. 33 Every nation
has its own needs and goals. A super-regulatory international agency or
an unsympathetic system of regulation will be unlikely to satisfy many
such needs. 3 4 By allowing each nation to amend and adopt policies or
rules that will improve market behavior, each agency can preserve the
national identity of its exchanges while promoting nation-specific goals
and interests. 31S Convergence of regulations in different countries pres298. Don Phillips & Richard M. Weintraub, Last Major U.S. Merchant Shippers
Seek Refuge Under Foreign Flag, WASH. POST, June 30, 1993, at A7. These two
carriers are the last two major flag merchant ship companies in the United States. Id.
In addition to the seven ships that have been relocated, six new ships that will be
delivered to the United States in 1995 will be registered in other nations. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Don Phillips, Merchant Shipper Says Subsidy Is Necessary; Official Threatens
to Remove U.S. Flag From Vessels If Promised Federal Aid Is Not Forthcoming,
WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 1993, at A20.
302.

See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION MARITIME ADMINISTRATION. UNIT-

ED STATES OCEANBORNE FOREIGN TRADE ROurEs OCTOBER 1992 29-31 (1992) (indicating that, in the U.S. shipping industry, statistics reveal that since 1956 the total
tonnage of U.S. oceanbome foreign trade has dropped from 20.7% to 4.1%). In fact,
the top three carriers transporting U.S. foreign trade include Liberia (24.2%), Norway
(10.2%), and Panama (9.9%). Id.
303. See Alva, supra note 291, at 888 n.8 (stating that the rise in the number of
incorporations in Delaware has increased the revenue generated from this activity from
$55.0 million in 1975 to $180.8 million in 1988, with projected revenues in 1992 at
$224.6 million). See Stone, supra note 285. at 252 (stating that stringent regulation
has forced the shipping industry to accept low-density routes at a loss).
304. 'See Edwards. supra note 2, at 2 (proposing that the'best solution to today's
problems lies not in less regulation but rather in more innovative regulation that remains sensitive to ,market realities and keeps everyday trends closer to home).
See Albrecht, supra note 24, at 11 (stating that "with the inevitable impact of
305.

648

AM. U. J. INT'L L & POL'Y

[VOL. 9:2

ents the optimal solution for the global arena. Such convergences will
result as each nation reacts individually to market situations, thereby
potentially alleviating fears of the lack of harmonization."
Therefore, the CFTC should continue to liberalize its rules by imposing less stringent or fewer duplicative requirements on its participants" so that domestic as well as foreign investors will want to
commence or continue transactions. 8 The Commission should increase
actions that alleviate burdensome procedures and unnecessary requirements in areas such as risk disclosure, speculative position limits, and
large order executions, which can impede or slow down the transactional

process.3" Furthermore, with increasing cross-border activity, the CFTC
should broaden the scope of rule 30 even further to encourage foreign

activity."' Excessive legislation can only hurt an industry.'

historical factors, there will certainly never be a complete convergence-nor should there
be"); Economic Causes, supra note 3, at 373 (noting that only some financial transactions
require standardized rules in the international arena and regulators must respect the
participants' needs to have differing rules for different purposes); Corcoran, supra note
114, at 18-20 (indicating that deregulation also encourages innovation and matching user
needs and demands by replacing general standards of caution for "prescriptive standards of
design").
306. See Economic Causes, supra note 3, at 373 (stating that each market can
implement regulation that directly confronts externalities without requiring standardization); Albrecht, supra note 24, at 4 (asserting that "equally powerful forces are driving some regulatory functions . . .toward a convergence, a common middle ground");
Corcoran, supra note 114, at 12-18 (articulating that deregulation can induce consolidation because deregulation eliminates restrictions that may create barriers for competing interests).
307. See Stone. supra note 285, at 250 (asserting that deregulation does not imply
no regulation but rather a reduction in regulation providing participants with the freedom to engage in activity without fear from government intervention).
308. See Worth, supra note 235, at 142-43 (stating that conflicting securities regulation that creates more expensive forums will compel companies to select the
cheapest forums from which to conduct their activity).
309. See Executive Summary, supra note 151, at 37-38 (indicating that the CFTC
has implemented amendments that facilitates the crossing of orders for large order
executions). The Commission has implemented proposals to improve the competitiveness of U.S. financial markets. Id. at 28. For example, the Commission took measures
to facilitate the transaction of swaps and other off-exchange products and contracts of
hybrid instruments and to update electronic trading and trade recordation systems. Id.
at 28-39.
310. See ROBERT K. WILMOUTH, INTERNATIONAL CROSS REGISTRATION OF FUTURES PROFESSIONAL, 1991 FUTURES AND OPTIONS MARKET REGULATORS SYMPOSIUM
(asserting that the rapid internationalization of the commodities market should convince the CFTC and the SROs to allow cross-licensing). Cross-licensing enables for-
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On the other hand, the United Kingdom should implement Large's
recommendations so that investors will continue to participate in the
markets without fear of market failure and lack of customer protection. 1 2 With embarrassing incidents weakening investor confidence,
investors will want guarantees that their transactions are protected from
fraudulent and irregular behavior. While investors may prefer to transact
in an environment with minimal regulation, the United Kingdom needs
to ensure that its investors are receiving adequate protection because no
regulation or ineffective regulation can be as detrimental as excessive
regulation.3"3 Investors preferring government protection will find other
markets providing sufficient investor support. Sacrificing legislation does
not offer the proper solution.3" 4 Consequently, it appears as if the United Kingdom will face a stricter regulatory environment.3"5

eign traders registered with their perspective regulatory organization to trade directly
on U.S. exchanges without registration with U.S. regulatory organizations. Id.
311. See S. Craig Pirrong, Removing Undue Regulatory Impediments to the Use of
Futures and Options by Institutional Investors, in REGULATORY REvIEW AND REFORM
OF THE FUTURES INDUSTRY 55-56 (Robert J. Mackay & Robert W. Kamphuis, Jr.
eds., 1992) (stating that deregulation can benefit an industry by relaxing those rules
that burden participants from developing innovative derivative transactions and from
unnecessary costs and duplicative procedures). See Stone, supra note 275, at 245
(stating that each nation should look to the overall picture favoring public/investor
interests and not specific interest groups who seek to limit competition and competitors).
312. See Benston, supra note 279, at 278-79 (stating that government intervention
can help an industry bring about consensus required for effective market pursuits).
Standardization of rules can add efficiency and investor confidence and prevent unfair
play by its members. Id.
313. See TRADING IN FUTURES, supra note 34, at 64 (stating that the motivating
reason to institute a regulatory system was to convince its investors that they would
receive sufficient protection from a new framework that supervised futures brokers and
dealers).
314. See Benston, supra note 267. 278-79 (stating that a race to the bottom, reducing regulation to a point that provides inadequate customer protection, has never
been suggested as a viable solution).
315. See Markham & Bergin, supra note 60, at 591 (stating that, generally, the
foreign exchanges faced far fewer restrictions than the United States). The United
Kingdom's London Metal Exchange provides one such example. Id. This market,
however, may soon have self-regulatory protections. Id. at 591 n.63. See also NatWest
Chief, supra note 147 (revealing that Large anticipates that many of his recommendations should be in effect by mid-summer and that most should follow within the next
twelve months). See also SIB Reviews Reform Program Highlights Objectives for
1994, INT'L SEC. REG. REP., Dec. 14, 1993 (noting that the SIB announced in its
report, "Review Implementation," that its objectives for 1994 are to: 1) commission
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The U.S. and U.K. regulatory systems appear to be engaging in market appropriate behavior and should expect rewarding results from their
committed actions. By remaining market sensitive, the United Kingdom
and the United States are reaching a point of convergence as the United
Kingdom increases its level of regulation and the United States decreases its level of regulation.3" 6 The principle of convergence can offer a
challenge to criticisms that promote standardization of rules.
To encourage attainment of the optimal level of convergence, international organizations like IOSCO should promote establishment of comparable rules.317 IOSCO serves as a neutral body that recommends, rather
than imposes, action.31 ' Thus, participants attend the conferences to
discuss current market trends and problems and to devise a satisfactory
solution acceptable to all its members.3 19 While none of the recommendations obligate implementation by the members, most choose to do so;
if certain members instigate policies furthering IOSCO's suggestions,
others feel the need to harmonize their rules accordingly or else face
competitive inequality that might deter potential investors. IOSCO
should continue to hold meetings regularly to discuss current problems
and resolve issues.32 ° Without a super-regulatory body governing the
market, market participants must create a forum encouraging unity and
progress toward a more profitable and healthy market within the indus"'
try; IOSCO can fulfill this role.32

an inter-regulation task force who can propose recommendations on disclosure concerning anti-competitive practices to the Chancellor of the Exchequer; 2) issue a report about the Investor Compensation Scheme by April of 1994; 3) invite comments
regarding the issue of custody; 4) function within its revised organizational structure
of four divisions consisting of supervision, enforcement, policy and legal affairs, and
operations; and 5) issue consultative documents on the Investment Services Directive
and the Capital Adequacy Directive).
316. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (listing various changes implemented
by the United States and the United Kingdom that will eventually intersect to form a
level of convergence).
317. See Worth, supra note 235, at 145 (stating that multilateral organizations like
IOSCO can contribute to harmonize efforts in regulation).
318. See Guy, supra note 230, at 294 (describing the ways in which the IOSCO
can attempt to pursuade international actors to adapt its recommendations).
319. Guy, supra note 230, at 294-95.
320. See News in Brief, supra note 231 (stating that IOSCO's goals for 1994
include proposals to promote a higher profile, to expand its officers' language proficiency, and to establish closer communications with the Basle group of banking supervisors).
321. See News in Brief, supra note 231 (noting that Andrew Large stated that
IOSCO should strive to improve its enforcement capabilities and settle problems aris-
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In addition, MOUs harmonize rules and foster the standardization of
regulation, but in a more diplomatic manner. These bilateral agreements
are not absolutely mandatory, but the spirit of friendship and the compelling need to reach a common ground between nations encourages the
participants to implement the agreements. MOUs serve an important
function by providing solutions to problems on an "as needed" basis. 22
Moreover, MOUs can remain sensitive to market needs and, most importantly, to the needs of each commodity exchange. MOUs and IOSCO
Working Parties function as the international body that critics who propose a standardized system governed by one body so desire. Concomitant with MOUs and IOSCO Working Parties, convergence of regulation
reached as each agency adopts legislation in reaction to current market
forces will harmonize the commodities industry and stimulate market
efficiency and market solutions to internationalization. 3
CONCLUSION
The commodities industry has experienced a long and expansive history. From the early agricultural markets to the innovative financial futures
and options markets, each nation has faced the need to supervise the
industry in some manner. The United States became one of the first
nations to create a highly regulated market with an agency devoted
specifically to the regulation of commodities.324 While the United
Kingdom formally had little or no regulation of the commodities market,
it has introduced recently more substantive legislation that regulates the
industry.3" The divergent backgrounds explain why the nations are
currently practicing opposite regulatory strategies: the United States
seeks to decrease its regulation level while the United Kingdom seeks to
ing from innovative derivative transactions).
322. See Economic Causes, supra note 3. at 368-69 (stating that these bilateral
treaties serve to provide an effective network for cooperation and for the exchange of
information).
323. See Economic Causes, supra note 3, at 373 (encouraging international securities regulation to follow a balanced approach that relies on basic forms of cooperation
in enforcement and coordination on compliance, rather than adhering to a single transnational regulatory philosophy).
.324. See TRADING IN FUTURES, supra note 34, at 72-73 (stating that the United
States has an extensive history of regulating the commodity markets, as demonstrated
by several legislative acts).
325. See Thorpe, supra note 24, at 152 (indicating that the financial services industry functioned without the intervention of governmental regulation until the 1970s
and 1980s).
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increase its regulation.
William Albrecht, former Chairman of the CFTC, asserted that the
increasing and decreasing regulatory activities, while creating on the
surface an illusion of the markets diverging, in fact disguise the actual
movement toward a common middle ground.3 6 Regulatory convergence
reached by the agencies can provide comparable playing fields so that
no one market will serve as a refuge for crooks and profiteers.327
Therefore, convergence, rather than standardization, provides the best
solution. MOUs, contracted between agencies and IOSCO Working
Parties recommending various solutions, help agencies reach that level of
convergence.32 Convergence remedies the problems created by the
internationalization of the market, the new competitive era of commodities, the varied makeup of the participants, and the increasing costs
engendered by duplicative regulation." 9 Convergence maintains the
national identity and interest of each nation, two fundamental qualities
that strengthen a nation and its industry.33 Lastly, convergence can
best strengthen today's commodities market and guide that market into
the twenty-first century.
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